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Confusing the Fifth Amendment with the Sixth: Lower Court 
Misapplication of the Innis Definition of Interrogation 
INTRODUCTION 
For centuries, Anglo-American law enforcement has relied on con-
fessions to prosecute individuals accused of crimes.1 At common law, 
any confession, even one obtained by physical torture, could be en-
tered into evidence against a defendant. 2 But beginning in the eight-
eenth and nineteenth centuries, courts started ·to establish rules that 
limited the excesses of police practices. 3 Since that time there· has been 
tremendous debate as to what constitutes improper "police interroga-
tion." In this century, scholars and jurists continue to disagree over 
the role and significance of confessions in criminal investigation and 
prosecution.4 Some have contended that interrogation is a necessary 
component of modem law enforcement, 5 while others have suggested 
that it is not indispensable. 6 Still others have concluded that depen-
dence on confessions is d~gerous to a free society.7 · 
Despite these disagreements, most will concede that modem inter-
rogation no longer relies on the use of physical force to the extent that 
was once common. Rather, police employ more subtle forms of inter-
rogation comprised of psychological ploys and techniques. 8 Such 
practices, however, are equally susceptible to abuse,9 and commenta-
1. See generally W. L.AFAVE & J. ,lsRAEL, CRIMINAL PROCEDURE§ 6.2(a) (1985). 
2. Id. 
3. Id.; Y. KAMISAR, W. LAFAVE & J. ISRAEL, MODERN CRIMINAL PROCEDURE 518 (6th 
ed. 1986) [hereinafter MODERN CRIMINAL PROCEDURE]; see also The King v. Warickshall, 168 
Eng. Rep. 234, L. Leach Cr. Cases 263 (K.B. 1783) (first stated formal rule of exclusion for 
improper confessions) .. 
4. See generally W. LAFAVE & J. ~SRAEL, supra note 1, at§ 6.l(a). 
5. See, e.g., lnbau, Police f nterrogation - A Practical Necessity, 52 J. CRIM. L., CRIMINOL-
OGY & POLICE SCI. 16 (1961) (suggesting the importance of interrogating suspects in order to 
solve crimes); Grano, Rhode Island v. Innis: A Need to Reconsider the Constitutional Premises 
Underlying the Law of Confessions, 11 AM. CRIM. L. REv. 1 (1979) (suggesting that police inter-
rogation is not only desirable, but essential to successful law enforcement). 
6. See, e.g., Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 477 (1966). 
7. See, e.g., Escobedo v. Illinois, 378 U.S. 478, 488-89 (1964) ("We have learned the lesson of 
history, ancient and modem, that a system of criminal law enforcement which comes to depend 
on the 'confession' will, in the long run, be less reliable and more subject to abuses than a system 
which depends on extrinsic evidence independently secured through skillful investigation.") 
(footnotes omitted). 
8. Inbau, supra note 5, at 16; see also W. LAFAVE & J. ISRAEL, supra note 1, at § 6.l(b) 
("['f]here does seem to be general agreement that forms of illegality have become less extreme."); 
0. STEPHENS, THE SUPREME CoURT AND CoNFESSIONS OF GUILT 5-6 (1973) ("The use of 
overt physical violence has largely given way to the employment of more subtle kinds of 
pressure."). 
9. W. LAFAVE & J. lsRAEL, supra note 1, at§ 6.l(b). 
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tors continue to debate the propriety of these methods.10 
The Supreme Court struggled with the problems posed by interro-
gation begining in the mid-1930s11 and culminating with Miranda v. 
Arizona, 12 which set down rules designed to limit the excesses of police 
practices. The Miranda Court quoted at length from police interroga-
tion manuals, but it never said flatly that any of the practices were 
banned by the Constitution or that their use alone would render a 
confession inadmissible. Rather, the Court held that absent the now 
familiar warnings, confessions obtained by means of "custodial inter-
rogation" would be inadmissible.13 
It was not until 1980, in Rhode Island v. Innis, 14 that the Court 
provided much guidance as to what it meant by "interrogation." In 
Innis, the Court made it plain that conduct other than direct question-
ing could constitute interrogation. Writing for a divided Court, Jus-
tice Stewart defined interrogation as "words or actions on the part of 
police (other than those normally attendant to arrest and custody) that 
the police should know are reasonably likely to elicit an incriminating 
response from the suspect."ts 
Numerous subsequent cases have applied the Innis standard. 
Although lower courts have utilized this standard on a case-by-case 
basis, this Note groups cases according to six fact patterns. Such clas-
sification reveals common methods of reasoning and demonstrates 
what the Innis standard has come to mean in practice. 
The first group of cases involves situations in which the presence of 
friends or relatives helps produce incriminating statements. 16 A sec-
ond group of cases considers volunteered statements and follow-up 
questions.17 Such statements typically occur after a suspect makes a 
harmless, voluntary statement, and the police respond with a follow-
up question that produces an incriminating response. A third cate-
gory of cases focuses on the exception Innis carved out for procedures 
10. Compare lnbau, supra note 5, at 16 (contending that most crimes can be solved only 
through the use of admissions and confessions, and that suspects will not admit their guilt unless 
questioned) and Grano, Book Review, 84 MICH. L. REV. 662, 690 (1986) (reviewing F. INBAU, J. 
REID & J. BUCKLEY, CRIMINAL INTERROGATION AND CoNFESSIONS (3d ed. 1986)) (arguing 
that reasonable interrogation designed to convince a suspect to tell the truth is completely consis· 
tent with a free, civilized, and just society) with Weisberg, Police Interrogation of Arrested Per· 
sons: A Skeptical View, 52 J. CRIM. L., CRIMINOLOGY & POLICE Sci. 21, 46 (1961) (contending 
that any pre-judicial interrogation is irreconcilable with the privilege against self-incrimination 
and the right to counsel) and White, Police Trickery in Inducing Confessions, 127 U. PA. L. REV. 
581 (1979) (arguing that effective protection of constitutional rights can be achieved only 
through the development of per se rules prohibiting certain forms of police trickery). 
11. See W. LAFAVE & J. ISRAEL, supra note 1, at§ 6.l(c). 
12. 384 U.S. 436 (1966). 
13. 384 U.S. at 444-45. 
14. 446 U.S. 291 (1980). 
15. 446 U.S. at 301 (footnote omitted). 
16. See infra Part II.A. 
17. See infra Part 11.B. 
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that are "normally attendant to arrest and custody."18 These cases 
consider the permissibility of procedures and questions that are part of 
police processing. Still another group involves "subtle compulsion" -
those acts directed toward a suspect or words spoken among others in 
the presence of the suspect that produce an incriminating response.19 
A fifth class of decisions has also applied the Innis test to the common 
police practice of using a ''jail plant" to acquire incriminating infor-
mation from an incarcerated defendant. 20 The sixth and final group of 
cases concerns "implied questioning" - police statements that are not 
questions but where arguably "[e]verything [is] there but a question 
mark."21 These cases can involve casual conversations between police 
officers and a suspect that, though unrelated to the crime, eventually 
produce incriminating statements. They also embrace situations in 
which spontaneous remarks of shock or surprise by police officers in-
duce damaging responses. 
Lower courts disagree over how to apply the Innis standard for 
interrogation in these various common fact patterns. This Note exam-
ines how these courts have applied or misapplied Innis, and concludes 
that, while many of these decisions are consistent with Miranda and 
Innis, too many others are not. 
In order to evaluate these cases, it is first necessary to understand 
the meaning and significance of Innis. Part I thus considers Innis and 
its background. Part II then examines lower court decisions applying 
the Innis test, dividing these decisions into six groups based on the 
most common factual scenarios. Because the cases deal with factually 
specific police practices, this method constitutes the most useful way 
to analyze the impact of the Innis definition of interrogation. Part III 
proposes a reading of the Innis test that avoids the diffi.cultie_s encoun-
tered by lower courts and that is consistent with the dictates of Mi-
randa and Innis. The Note concludes by considering how lower 
courts applying Innis have confused fifth and sixth amendment meth-
ods of analysis. 
I. BACKGROUND: RHODE ISLAND V. INNIS AND INTERROGATION 
In Miranda and Innis the Supreme Court demonstrated a concern 
about police practices that compel a suspect to make incriminating 
statements. These decisions mandate that lower courts analyzing in-
terrogation assess a suspect's perception of the coerciveness of police 
behavior. For the Court, the suspect's perceptions, and not the intent 
18. 446 U.S. at 301; see infra Part 11.C. 
19. See infra Part 11.D. 
20. See infra Part 11.E. 
21. Combs v. Commonwealth, 438 S.W.2d 82, 86 (Ky. 1969) (Palmore, J., dissenting); see 
infra Part 11.F. 
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of the officers, are dispositive.22 
A. Massiah v. United States and the Right to Counsel 
In Massiah v. United States, 23 the Supreme Court considered the 
significance of what is sometimes, but misleadingly, called interroga-
tion in the context of the sixth amendment right to counsel.24 It is 
necessary to consider the Court's approach to police practices in the 
context of the sixth amendment to understand how the focus of Innis 
is different. Innis, a fifth amendment case, is concerned with compul-
sion and the perceptions of the suspect. Sixth amendment analysis, 
under Massiah, turns on police intent. 
Massiah concerned a defendant who was released on bail after hav-
ing been indicted. His co-defendant, in cooperation with the govern-
ment, invited Massiah to discuss the case in a car equipped with a 
radio transmitter. Federal agents overheard the transmitted conversa-
tion and used Massiah's statements against him at ttjal. The Supreme 
Court found these statements inadmissible as defendant had been sub-
jected to extrajudicial, police-orchestrated proceedings designed to 
elicit an incriminating response.25 The Massiah decision established 
that once a defendant is indicted, "the suspect" becomes "the ac-
cused" and the right to counsel attaches. Massiah's incriminating 
words were inadmissible as they "had been deliberately elicited from 
him after he had been indicted and in the absence of his retained 
counsel. "26 
22. Innis, 446 U.S. at 301 ("The latter portion of [the Innis] definition [of interrogation] 
focuses primarily upon the perceptions of the suspect, rather than the intent of the police."). 
23. 377 U.S. 201 (1964). 
24. Wh~t is sometimes labelled "interrogation" in the context of sixth amendment or Mas-
siah doctrine is not really "interrogation" at all, as that term is used in the Miranda context. 
Confusion results from the fact that in ~rewer v. Williams, 430 U.S. 387 (1977), the Court, per 
Justice Stewart, said: "[T]he clear rule of Massiah is that once adversary proceedings have [be· 
gun, a person] has a right to legal representation when the government interrogates him." 430 
U.S. at 401 (emphasis added) (footnote omitted). 
Professor Yale Kamisar criticized Justice Stewart for using the term "interrogation," point· 
ing out that there was nothing resembling Miranda-type "interrogation" in the Massiah case 
itself. -Kamisar, Brewer v. Williams, Massiah and Miranda: What is "Interrogation"? When 
Does it Matter?, 67 GEO. L.J. 1,.33 (1978) (suggesting that compulsion is required before some-
thing constitutes interrogation) [hereinafter Kamisar, What is Interrogation?]; see also W. 
LAFAVE & J. ISRAEL, supra note 1, at§ 6.4(d). Rather, all that is needed for Massiah to apply, 
as Stewart recognized at other places in Williams, is for the government to deliberately elicit 
statements from a person after he has been indicted. 430 U.S. at 387. In Rhode Island v. Innis, 
446 U.S. 291 (1980), an opinion also written by Stewart, the Court apparently recognized that 
the term "interrogation" may not be appropriate in the sixth amendment context. 446 U.S. at 
300 n.4. Stewart's Innis opinion stated that the term "interrogation" is not "necessarily inter-
changeable" in the Miranda and Massiah contexts since the policies underlying these doctrines 
are "quite distinct." Seemingly acknowledging his earlier error, Stewart explicitly referred to the 
Kamisar article that criticized his misuse of the term "interrogation" in Williams, 446 U.S. at 
300 n.4. · 
25. Massiah, 377 U.S. at 204. 
26. 377 U.S. at 204. 
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The Massiah doctrine protects the right of individuals to receive 
the aid of counsel through each step of the adversary process. Massiah 
provides protection by preventing the government from deliberately 
eliciting or inducing incriminating statements - an analysis which 
turns on the government's purpose.27 If the government's actions are 
intended to produce an incriminating response, Massiah holds that the 
sixth amendment rights of the suspect have been violated.28 
Under Massiah, the perceptions of the suspect are not significant. 
Indeed, it makes no difference whether or not the individual is aware 
that she is dealing with a government agent. 29 The police violate that 
right by intentionally or deliberately eliciting statements from a person 
without counsel after adversary proceedings have commenced. 
For a time, the Court considered extending Massiah protections to 
the pre-indictment period. 30 This prospect worried many critics of the 
Court who were somewhat relieved when the Miranda Court turned 
27. See Brewer v. Williams, 430 U.S. 387 (1977). Williams is credited with having revital-
ized the Massiah approach after Miranda had cast doubt on its continued significance. See W. 
LAFAVE & J. lsRAEL, supra note 1, at § 6.4(d). Williams, in Massiah type reasoning, focused on 
the fact that the "detective deliberately and designedly set out to elicit information" from the 
defendant. 430 U.S. at 399. The Court, in United States v. Henry, 447 U.S. 264 (1980), a more 
recent case in the Massiah line, "refined" Massiah in the same way that Innis clarified Miranda. 
See White, Interrogation Without Question: Rhode Island v. Innis and United States v. Henry, 
78 MICH. L. REv. 1209 (1980). Professor White suggests that Henry extended Massiah by "ap-
plying it to a situation where there was no showing that a government agent did anything 
designed to elicit incriminating remarks." Id. at 1220. But see Kamisar, Police Interrogation and 
Confessions, in J. CHOPER, Y. KAMISAR & L. TRIBE, 2 THE SUPREME COURT: TRENDS AND 
DEVELOPMENTS 1979-1980, at 83, 104 (1981) [hereinafter TRENDS] (remarks of Professor 
Kamisar) (although the Henry majority's analysis lacked precision, Henry appears to be viewed 
by the majority as a genuine 'deliberately elicited' type of case). In other words, after Henry it is 
still true that Massiah turns solely on the underlying intent of the government's agents. Id. 
28. 377 U.S. at 205-06. 
29. 377 U.S. at 206 ("Massiah was more seriously imposed upon ... because he did not even 
know that he was under interrogation by a government agent.") (quoting U.S. v. Massiah, 307 
F.2d 62, 72-73 (2d Cir. 1962)(Hays, J., dissenting). 
30. In Escobedo v. Illinois, 378 U.S. 478 (1964), the Court seemingly applied Massiah to the 
admissibility of incriminating statements made by an individual before the commencement of 
adversary proceedings. Escobedo had been arrested on suspicion of murder after being accused 
by his accomplice. While in custody, Escobedo repeatedly asked to speak to his lawyer but was 
denied the opportunity. Instead, the police set up a confrontation between Escobedo and his 
accomplice. At this point, Escobedo denied his guilt and charged his accuser with firing the 
murder shots, thus implicating himself in the murder plot. At trial, these statements were admit-
ted into evidence and Escobedo was convicted of murder. The Supreme Court reversed the 
conviction and criticized police on the use of confessions. 378 U.S. at 484, 488-90. By suggesting 
that there was "no meaningful distinction ... between interrogation of an accused before and 
after formal indictment," 378 U.S. at 486, the Escobedo Court appeared to move the sixth 
amendment right to counsel protections to the pre-indictment period and thus into the police 
station. See 378 U.S. at 490-91. Henceforth, it seemed that lower courts would be required to 
apply Massiah's "deliberately elicited" standard to all police "interrogation." 
Language in Escobedo threatened to eliminate completely the use of confessions. Confessions 
would cease because most attorneys would advise their clients to remain silent. This prospect led 
critics of the Court's approach to protest that an individual does not have a right not to confess; 
rather, the critics argue, the individual only has a right not to be compelled to confess. See Enker 
& Elsen, Counsel for the Suspect: Massiah v. United States and Escobedo v. Illinois, 49 MINN. L. 
REv. 47, 60-61 (1964); Kamisar, What is Interrogation?, supra note 24, at 48. 
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from Massiah's sixth amendment approach to a focus on the fifth 
amendment privilege against self-incrimination.31 Interrogation prior 
to indictment has become the primary concern of the fifth rather than 
the sixth amendment,32 and while Massiah remains good law, it is rele-
vant only to the post-indictment stage. During this stage, Massiah 
protects the right to counsel through each step of the adversary pro-
cess. Impermissible police interference with that right includes all ac-
tions that attempt to "deliberately elicit" incriminating responses. 
Miranda and Innis, however, were fifth amendment cases and In-
nis' definition of interrogation in the fifth amendment context rested 
upon and was shaped by a different premise.33 In Innis, intent was of 
only limited significance.34 
B. Miranda v. Arizona and the Right Against Self-Incrimination 
As noted above, the Massiah holding rested on the sixth amend-
me~t right to counsel. The Miranda decision shifted that focus and 
developed an interrogation doctrine based on the fifth amendment. 35 
The Miranda Court held that the privilege against self-incrimination 
31. See MODERN CRIMINAL PROCEDURE, supra note 3, at 535-37. 
32. See Kirby v. Illinois, 406 U.S. 682, 689 (1972) (stating that Escobedo is now limited in its 
"holding ..• to its own facts."). In Kirby, the Supreme Court declined to extend sixth amend-
ment pre-adversary proceeding protections to the line-up context. See also infra note 45 and 
accompanying text (sixth amendment rights and the Massiah doctrine apply only after the initia-
tion of formal charges). Escobedo is now viewed as a "false start" toward protections that later 
would be the province of Miranda. W. LAFAVE & J. ISRAEL, supra note I, at§ 6.4(c). 
33. See Rhode Island v. Innis, 446 U.S. 291, 301 (1980) ("The definitions of 'interrogation' 
under the Fifth and Sixth Amendment ... are not necessarily interchangeable, since the policies 
underlying the two constitutional protections are quite distinct."); Kamisar, What is "Interroga-
tion"?, supra note 24 at 41-55. 
34. See Innis, 446 U.S. at 303. 
35. Escobedo's potential to eliminate even voluntary confessions, see supra note 30 and ac-
companying text, accounts in part for the shift to the fifth amendment's protection against self-
incrimination in subsequent cases. See MODERN CRIMINAL PROCEDURE, supra note 3, at 535. 
The privilege against self-incrimination had not been used before because many believed it was 
only relevant to cases of legal compulsion. Because police do not have legal power to force 
someone to answer a question, police interrogation was not thought to violate the fifth amend-
ment. Id. at 536; see also L. MAYERS, SHALL WE AMEND THE FIFTH AMENDMENT? 82-83, 
223-32 (1959); W. SCHAEFER, THE SUSPECT AND SOCIETY, 16-18 (1967). 
In fact, it has been argued that police often act as if, and give suspects the impression that, 
they have such authority. Generally, suspects answer police questions because they are misled 
into believing that they must. Kamisar, A Dissent from the Miranda Dissents: Some Comments 
on the "New" Fifth Amendment and the Old "Voluntariness" Test, 65 MICH. L. REV. 59, (1966). 
Consequently, the station house, or the "gatehouse of American Criminal Procedure," represents 
an inherently compulsive environment. Kamisar, Equal Justice in the Gatehouses and Mansions 
of American Criminal Procedure, in Y. KAMISAR, F. INBAU & T. ARNOLD, CRIMINAL JumcE 
IN OUR TIME 19-36 (Howard ed. 1965); see also Weisberg, supra note 10, at 21. 
In his study, Magistrate Weisberg examined police interrogation practices through a study of 
police interrogation manuals, and concluded that effective police interrogation was essentially 
unfair and inherently coercive. But see Grano, supra note 5, at 26 (suggesting that "application 
of even the fifth amendment protection against compulsory self-incrimination beyond the judicial 
context ... is dubious."). 
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"is fully applicable during a period of custodial interrogation."36 Af-
ter considering common police practices, the Court noted that "we 
concern ourselves primarily with this interrogation atmosphere and 
the evils it can bring."37 The Court conceded that "we might not find 
the defendant's statements to have been involuntary in traditional 
terms." It insisted, however, that "[u]nless adequate protective de-
vices are employed to dispel the compulsion inherent in custodial sur-
roundings, no statement obtained from the defendant can truly be the 
product of his free choice."38 Miranda thus held that evidence ob-
tained by interrogation was inadmissible if the means of interrogation 
violated the procedural requirements of the Constitution. 39 
Several limits on the use of confessions follow from this conclu-
sion. First, Miranda bars evidence obtained by interrogation prior to 
the giving of the "Miranda warnings." Second, if an individual indi-
cates that he or she wishes to remain silent, interrogation must cease. 
Third, if the individual requests an attorney, no further interrogation 
is permitted until an attorney is present.40 
36. 384 U.S. 436, 460-61 (1966). The Supreme Court has also rejected the view thatMiranda 
applies only to questioning of a suspect who is in custody in connection with the case under 
investigation, Mathis v. United States 391 U.S. 1 (1968). Other cases find that it makes no 
difference whether the police consider the defendant a suspect or a witness; custodial interroga-
tion can take place even though the police contend that the individual being questioned was a 
witness. See, e.g., People v. Lee, 630 P.2d 583 (Colo. 1981) (en bane), cert denied, 454 U.S. 1162 
(1982). 
37. 384 U.S. at 456. 
38. 384 U.S. at 457-58. 
39. 384 U.S. at 457-58. 
40. 384 U.S. at 467-70. The Miranda doctrine might be thought to afford two levels of pro-
tection. "First level" protections exist before a suspect is given the Miranda warnings and before 
she invokes the right to counsel. Courts that consider "first level" protections should evaluate 
whether police action rose to the level of interrogation. "Second level" protections exist once a 
suspect invokes the right to remain silent or asks for a lawyer. See Y. Kamisar, "Police Interro-
gation and Confessions," Prepared Remarks at the U.S. Law Week's Constitutional Law Confer-
ence 32-34 (Sept. 12, 1987) (on file with Professor Kamisar) [hereinafter Kamisar, U.S. Law 
Week Remarks]. Once the right to remain silent has been asserted, the issue is whether the 
police "scrupulously honored" the suspect's assertion of the right or whether they impermissibly 
prompted the suspect to change her mind. Michigan v. Mosley, 423 U.S. 96, 104 (1975). When 
the suspect asserts her right to counsel, the analysis is different. In such a case, the police may no 
longer interrogate the suspect until counsel has been made available or the accused herself initi-
ates further communication. See Edwards v. Arizona, 451 U.S. 477, 484-85 (1981) (stating that 
once a suspect invokes his right to counsel, a "waiver of that right cannot be established by 
showing only that he responded to further police-initiated custodial interrogation even if he had 
been advised of his rights;" the suspect cannot be "subject to further interrogation . . . until 
counsel has been made available to him, unless the [suspect] himself initiates further communica-
tion ... with the police."). See also W. LAFAVE & J. ISRAEL, supra note 1, at§ 6.9(g) (making 
clear that there is a different approach for questioning after the right to remain silent is invoked 
than after the defendant requests a lawyer). 
This distinction between the right to counsel and the right to remain silent was reinforced by 
Oregon v. Bradshaw, 462 U.S. 1039 (1983), where the Court suggested a two-step analysis to 
determine the admissibility of a confession after the right to counsel has been invoked. Step one 
asks whether the defendant "initiated" further conversation; step two asks whether "the pur-
ported waiver was knowing and intelligent." 462 U.S. at 1046 (quoting Edwards v. Arizona, 451 
U.S. 477, 486 n.9 (1981)). See also Arizona v. Roberson, 108 S. Ct. 2093, 2099 (1988) (distin-
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It is important to note that the Miranda decision requires courts to 
examine whether or not the police attempted to compel41 an incrimi-
nating :i;esponse42 and that the doctrine protects suspects prior to the 
commencement of adversary proceedings.43 Miranda is thus distinct 
from Massiah, 44 which applies whether or not the authorities com-
pelled incriminating statements and does not furnish protection before 
adversary proceedings have begun.45 
Miranda's focus on compulsion arises from the fact that its 
rationale rests on the fifth amendment. The fifth amendment provides 
that no person "shall be compelled in any criminal case to be a witness 
against himself."46 As a result, commentators have suggested that 
there is no right not to confess; there is only a right not to be com-
pelled to confess.47 The language of Miranda itself supports this prop-
guishing Mosley because "a suspect's decision to cut off questioning, unlike his request for coun· 
set, does not raise the presumption that he is unable to proceed without a lawyer's advice") 
(citations omitted). But see TRENDS, supra note 27, at 153-57 (remarks of Professor Kamisar) 
(suggesting that the standard should be the same if police questioning resumes after either the 
right to counsel or the right to remain silent has been invoked). 
However, the Supreme Court appears to have blurred the distinction between first and second 
level protections. In Arizona v. Mauro, 481 U.S. 520, 529-30 (1987), the Court took the position 
that the police "scrupulously honor'' a suspect's assertion of her rights as long as they do not 
engage in "interrogation" after those rights have been invoked. 
41. See Schulhofer, Reconsidering Miranda, 54 U. CHI. L. REV. 435, 440-46 (1987). 
Schulhofer discusses the apparent confusion regarding the meaning of the term "compulsion." 
He makes clear that "compulsion" under Miranda is analytically distinct from "coercion" and 
"involuntariness" under the due process standard. The voluntariness due process standard has 
been extensively criticized and many have considered it unworkable. See, e.g., sources cited infra 
note 164. For Schulhofer, voluntariness analysis considers whether police actions "break the 
suspect's will." Schulhofer, supra at 446 (footnote omitted). The Miranda Court did not create 
so stringent a test when it considered "compulsion" within the meaning of the fifth amendment. 
On the contrary, behavior that falls far short of "breaking the suspect's will" may constitute 
"compulsion." Compulsion extends to all governmental efforts intended to pressure an unwilling 
individual to assist as a witness in his own prosecution. "Custodial interrogation brings psycho-
logical pressure to bear for the specific purpose of overcoming the suspect's unwillingness to talk, 
and it is therefore inherently compelling within the meaning of the fifth amendment." Id. 
42. "Incriminating response" refers to any response the prosecution may seek to introduce at 
trial. See Schmerber v. California, 384 U.S. 757, 761 (1966). 
43. Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 444 (1966) (footnote omitted) The Miranda Court 
dealt with "custodial interrogation," meaning "questioning initiated by law enforcement officers 
after a person has been taken into custody or otherwise deprived of his freedom of action in any 
significant way." See supra notes 32-34 and accompanying text. For discussion of when Mi· 
randa protections come into play, see Kamisar, "Custodial Interrogation" Within the Meaning of 
Miranda, in CRIMINAL LAW AND THE CONSTITUTION - SOURCES AND COMMENTARIES 335, 
338-51 (1968); Smith, The Threshold Question in Applying Miranda: What Constitutes Custodial 
Inte"ogation?, 25 S. C.L. REv. 699, 707-10 (1974); Stone, The Miranda Doctrine in the Burger 
Court, 1977 SUP. Cr. REV. 99, 149. 
44. Massiah v. United States, 377 U.S. 201 (1964). See supra text accompanying notes 28-30. 
45. Moran v. Burbine, 475 U.S. 412 (1986) ("[T]he Sixth Amendment right to counsel does 
not attach until after the initiation of formal charges."); see Maine v. Moulton, 464 U.S. 159, 170 
(1985) (looking to the initiation of adversary judicial proceedings is fundamental to the proper 
application of the sixth amendment right to counsel). 
46. U.S. CoNsr. amend. V (emphasis added). 
47. See, e.g., H. FRIENDLY, BENCHMARKS 271 (1967); Enker & Elsen, supra note 30, at 60; 
Kamisar, What Is Inte"ogation?, supra note 24, at 48. 
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osition. The purpose of Miranda's protective devices was to ''dispel 
the compulsion inherent in custodial surroundings."48 After discuss-
ing various police interrogation tactics, the Court expressed concern 
with situations in which "[a]n individual swept from familiar sur-
roundings into police custody, surrounded by antagonistic forces, and 
subjected to the techniques of persuasion described above cannot be 
otherwise than under compulsion to speak. "49 In effect, this approach 
constituted a rejection of Massiah's sixth amendment approach to in-
terrogation;50 the Court's Miranda opinion did not even mention Mas-
siah. Under Miranda, instead of considering whether police conduct 
"deliberately elicited" incriminating statements, courts had to deter-
mine whether police conduct compelled them.51 
More recent decisions have not changed the significance of com-
pulsion to the issue of interrogation.52 For police action to rise to the 
level of interrogation under the fifth amendment, it must involve the 
requisite degree of compulsion. 53 
48. Miranda, 384 U.S. at 458 (emphasis added). 
49. 384 U.S. at 461 (emphasis added). The Court also noted that "without proper safeguards 
the process of in-custody interrogation of persons suspected or accused of crime contains inher-
ently compelling pressures which work to undermine the individual's will to resist and to compel 
him to speak where he would not otherwise do so freely." 384 U.S. at 467 (emphasis added). 
50. Some have suggested that interrogation is irrelevant to Massiah. See supra note 24. 
51. See supra notes 39-42 and accompanying text. Evidence of the shift in focus can be found 
in Hoffa v. United States, 385 U.S. 293, 303-04 (1966), where the Court considered facts similar 
to the Massiah case. In Hoffa, a government informer elicited incriminating information from a 
defendant who had been released from jail. But Hoffa, unlike Massiah, had not been indicted 
and so the court did not use Massiah's deliberately elicited standard. Rather, it applied Miranda 
and found the government's behavior permissible because there had been no compulsion. Since 
Hoffa did not know he was dealing with a government agent there was no pressure on him 
(inherent, informal or otherwise) to make incriminating statements and his right against self-
inprimination had not been violated. It was the suspect's perspective that was significant. See 
also Kamisar, What ls Interrogation?, supra note 24, at 63-65 ("[I]f it is not 'custodial police 
interrogation' in the eye of the beholder, then it is not such interrogation within the meaning of 
Miranda.") (emphasis in the original). But compare White, supra, note 10, at 602-05 (favoring a 
per se prohibition against deceiving a suspect about whether an interrogation is taking place, 
even during the period before indictment). 
52. In Beckwith v. United States, 425 U.S. 341 (1976), and Oregon v. Mathiason, 429 U.S. 
492 (1977), the Burger Court limited Miranda to situations involving "coercive environments" 
similar to those considered by the Miranda Court itself. In Mathiason, the Court stated that "[i]t 
was that sort of coercive environment to which Miranda by its terms was made applicable, and to 
which it is limited." 492 U.S. at 495. Despite this limitation, compulsion, and not police intent, 
is still dispositive to fifth amendment analysis. 
53. But see Grano, supra note 10, at 683-89. Even Grano, a critic of Miranda, concedes that 
under Miranda a suspect cannot be compelled to make self-incriminating statements. Given this 
fact, he directs attention to "the task of defining compulsion in the context of police interroga-
tion." Id. at 684. Only the requisite degree of compulsion is a constitutional violation. He 
criticizes those who overlook the fact "that distinguishing degrees is inherent in the process of 
defining the concept of compulsion," Id. at 688. For Grano, the point at which the degree of 
compulsion becomes "undue" should be a matter of policy, reflecting "society's desire, on the 
one hand, for successful police interrogation and society's revulsion, on the other hand, of certain 
offensive police methods." Id. at 687. 'Grano favors a return to the voluntariness test and due 
process approach to interrogation by incorporating these concepts into the meaning of "compul-
sion." See infra note 164 (discussing voluntariness test). Thus, he would find improper compul-
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C. The Innis Test for Interrogation and Subsequent Commentary 
1. The Decision Itself 
Despite Miranda's direction to consider the level of compulsion, 
lower courts remained confused as to what constituted interrogation. 
Some courts took a narrow view, finding that only direct questions 
constituted interrogation. 54 Other jurists suggested that there were 
many police practices that had "everything ... but a question mark" 
and that these methods generated the same pressures to confess that 
the Miranda warnings were designed to mitigate. 55 
In Rhode Island v. Innis, 56 the Court clarified the issue and defined 
what it had meant by "interrogation." The case arose when Thomas 
Innis was arrested on suspicion of murder, received Miranda warn-
ings, and asked to speak to an attorney. He was placed in the back 
seat of a police car for transport to the police station. While en route, 
two of the officers in the front seat, knowing that they could be over-
heard, engaged in a conversation regarding the missing murder 
weapon. One officer stated that there were many handicapped chil-
dren in the area and "God forbid one of them might find a weapon 
with shells and they might hurt themselves."57 Upon hearing the con-
versation, defendant asked that the car be turned around so he could 
lead the police to the weapon.58 His attorneys later sought to suppress 
evidence of both the weapon and his statements in connection with its 
discovery. 
Noting that many of the police methods criticized in Miranda did 
not involve direct questioning, the Innis Court observed that "the Mi-
randa safeguards come into play whenever a person in custody is sub-
jected to either express questioning or its functional equivalent."59 
Justice Stewart then wrote: " 'interrogation' under Miranda refers not 
only to express questioning, but also to any words or actions on the 
part of the police (other than those normally attendant to arrest and 
sion only after considering the "totality of the circumstances" and only if the "free will of the 
witness was overborne." Grano, supra note 10, at 688 (quoting United States v. Washington, 431 
U.S. 181, 188 (1987)). However, Grano concedes that his approach is inconsistent with Mi-
randa, which protected against "the inherent pressure of custodial interrogation." Id. at 689. 
See also supra note 41 (discussing the meaning of compulsion under Miranda and how it is 
distinct from involuntariness) and note 51 and accompanying text. 
A more appropriate reading of Miranda is that it prohibits compulsion that goes beyond the 
pressures inherent in custody. As Innis itSelf states, " '[i]nterrogation,' as conceptualized in the 
Miranda opinion, must reflect a measure of compulsion above and beyond that inherent in cus-
tody itself." Rhode Island v. Innis, 446 U.S. 291, 301 (1980) (footnote omitted). 
54. w. LAFAVE & J. ISRAEL, supra note 1, at§ 6.7(a). 
55. See, e.g., Combs v. Commonwealth, 438 S.W.2d 82, 86 (Ky. 1969) (Palmore, J., 
dissenting). 
56. 446 U.S. 291 (1980). 
57. 446 U.S. at 294-95. 
58. 446 U.S. at 295-96. 
59. 446 U.S. at 300-01. 
April 1989] Interrogation Under Innis 1083 
custody) that the police should know are reasonably likely to elicit an 
incriminating response from the suspect. "60 The Court explicitly 
stated that the focus of the test, which reflects the purposes of Mi-
randa, was on the perceptions of the suspect rather than on the intent 
of the police. 61 The Innis Court's references to Miranda also reinforce 
the significance of perceived compulsion in the context of the fifth 
amendment. As Justice Stewart's Innis opinion pointed out, Miranda 
was concerned that the " 'interrogation environment' created by the 
interplay of interrogation and custody would 'subjugate the individual 
to the will of his examiner' and thereby undermine the privilege 
against compulsory self-incrimination."62 Yet interrogation still had to 
"reflect a measure of compulsion above and beyond that inherent in 
custody itself."63 
In a footnote, the Court discussed the limited relevance of police 
intent and distinguished Massiah by rejecting the "deliberately elic-
ited" approach of sixth amendment analysis.64 Nothing in the record 
of the case indicated that the officer's remarks "were designed to elicit 
a response."65 For the Court, intent was significant only to the extent 
that it reflected whether the police knew, or should have known, that 
their words or actions were reasonably likely to evoke an incriminat-
ing response. 66 Consideration of intent in these terms means only that 
police cannot be held accountable for the unforeseeable results of their 
words or actions. 67 Police action has to be judged in terms of what the 
officers knew or should have known. In practice this means that if 
something about a suspect makes him peculiarly susceptible to a par-
ticular police action, interrogation occurs only if police should have 
known of this peculiarity. Intent becomes relevant only to the issue of 
foreseeability.68 The Court thus made clear that important distinc-
60. 446 U.S. at 301 (footnotes omitted). 
61. 446 U.S. at 301 ("The latter portion of this definition focuses primarily on the percep-
tions of the suspect, rather than the intent of the police."). 
62. 446 U.S. at 299 (quoting Miranda, 440 U.S. at 457-58) (emphasis added). 
63. 446 U.S. at 300 (footnote omitted). 
64. 446 U.S. at 300 n.4; see generally supra notes 23-34 & 50-51 and accompanying text 
(discussing Massiah). 
65. 446 U.S. at 303 n.9 (emphasis in original); see TRENDS, supra note 27, at 88. 
66. 446 U.S. at 302 n.7. See W. LAFAVE & J. ISRAEL, supra note 1, at§ 6.7(a) ("[I]t surely 
does not make sense to conclude that under Miranda the existence of 'interrogation' ... depends 
upon the undisclosed intentions of the officer. Miranda is grounded in the notion that custody 
plus interrogation produces a coercive atmosphere, which makes sense only when the suspect is 
aware of both custody and the interrogation."); see also MODERN CRIMINAL PROCEDURE, supra 
note 3, at 595; infra notes 83-88 and accompanying text (discussing dangers of intent analysis). 
67. Innis, 446 U.S. at 301-02 ("But, since the police surely cannot be held accountable for the 
unforeseeable results of their words or actions, the definition of interrogation can extend only to 
words or actions on the part of police officers that they should have known were reasonably likely 
to elicit an incriminating response.") (emphasis in original) (footnote omitted). 
68. The Innis Court's "reasonably likely" language may have been intended to convey fore-
seeability, the likelihood that an officer would know the practice was wrong, rather than the 
probability of success of the practice. Such a reading is endorsed by the majority opinion which 
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tions exist between the definitions of interrogation under the fifth and 
sixth amendments (if the latter even involved the term "inter-
rogation"). 69 
The Court went on to hold Innis' confession admissible because 
the "dangerous weapon conversation" did not constitute interroga-
tion. 70 The Court found that although the defendant may have been 
subjected to "subtle coercion," his response was not the product of 
conduct that the police should have known was reasonably likely· to 
elicit an incriminating response.71 
2. Subsequent Commentary 
Innis' "reasonably likely to elicit" test is ambiguous on its face and 
is made even more confused by a result that the dissenters charged, 
with some reason, "verges on the ludicrous."72 According to the dis-
senters, the officer's strong appeal to Innis' conscience seemed more 
than reasonably likely to elicit some response. 73 Although all but one 
Justice agreed with the "reasonably likely to elicit" test in the abstract, 
the Court failed to articulate a clear, substantive definition. 74 Com-
mentators and jurists have struggled to determine the, meaning of Innis 
by attempting to square the result with the test as it was articulated by 
the majority.75 
Three different interpretations of Innis are worthy of note. The 
first concerns the attempt by dissenting Justice Stevens to reconcile the 
majority's result with the articulated test. Justice Stevens criticized 
the majority's test because, as he read it, it turned on the apparent 
probability that police speech or conduct would elicit an incriminating 
response. 76 Under such a reading, the Court would prohibit only po-
appears to contrast likelihood and unforeseeability. 446 U.S. at 301-02. See also TRENDS, supra 
note 27, at 91-94 (remarks by Professor Kamisar) (suggesting that "reasonably likely" should be 
read to convey foreseeability and finding interrogation where police speech or conduct 
"foreseeably might elicit an incriminating statement or ... that would normally be understood as 
calling for a response about the merits of the case.") (emphasis in original). 
69. 446 U.S. at 300 n.4 ("The definitions of 'interrogation' under the Fifth and Sixth Amend-
ments, if indeed the term 'interrogation' is even apt in the Sixth Amendment context, are not 
necessarily interchangeable, since the policies underlying the two constitutional protections are 
quite distinct.") (citation omitted). 
70. 446 U.S. at 302-03. 
71. 446 U.S. at 303. 
72. 446 U.S. at 306 (Marshall, J., dissenting). 
73. 446 U.S. at 307. 
74. W. LAFAVE & J. lsRAEL, supra note 1, at § 6. 7(a). Interestingly, both the state and the 
defendant proposed the test adopted by the Court though they argued that it should be applied 
differently. See Brief for Petitioner at 21, 25 & n.12, Rhode Island v. Innis, 446 U.S. 291 (1980) 
(No. 78-1076); Brief for Respondent at 24-25, Rhode Island v. Innis, 446 U.S. 291 (1980) (No, 
78-1076). As a result, the Court may have been less alert to the problems the test would subse-
quently create. 
75. W. LAFAVE & J. ISRAEL, supra note 1, at§ 6.7(a); White, supra note 27, at 1224-36. 
76. See W. LAFAVE & J. ISRAEL, supra note 1, at§ 6.7(a); White, supra note 27, at 1224-25. 
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lice conduct that was "apparently likely to be successful" in eliciting 
incriminating statements.77 What level of probability was "high 
enough," however, remained unclear. Consequently, such an interpre-
tation of the test might permit lower courts to consider too many fac-
tors and to apply their subjective preferences. 78 
Other commentators have taken a different interpretation. Profes-
sor Welsh White believes that the Court meant to create an "objective 
observer" test. Under this approach, the issue becomes whether an 
objective observer, with the same knowledge of the suspect as the po-
lice, would infer upon hearing the officer's remarks that the police ac-
tion was "designed" to elicit incriminating information. 79 This 
interpretation clears up a good deal of the confusion created by the 
majority's discussion of intent. 80 The test requires examination only of 
the "objective purpose manifested by the police."81 If an objective ob-
server could conclude that the officer's action was not designed to in-
duce a statement, then the suspect would probably view the officer's 
purpose in the same way. 82 Thus, the perceptions of the suspect, 
which should be the focus of Innis, are of significant relevance. 
The role of intent in the Innis definition is probably the test's most 
confusing aspect. Intent can be considered, but it is of limited signifi-
cance. 83 To confound matters further, the Innis Court concluded that 
officers can be held responsible only for what they knew or should 
have known. 84 Professor White properly appreciated that, while 
phrased in terms of intent, the Innis standard is primarily concerned 
with a suspect's perceptions. 85 Again, his reading of the test focuses 
on an objective observer's perceptions of what was intended. But be-
It should be noted that Stevens, in addition to characterizing the majority's view, created his own 
definition of interrogation encompassing "any police statement or conduct that has the same 
purpose or effect as a direct question [including s]tatements that call for a response from the 
suspect, as well as those that are designed to do so." Innis, 446 U.S. at 311 (Stevens, J., 
dissenting). 
77. TRENDS, supra note 27, at 91 (remarks by Professor Kamisar) .. Under the probability 
approach, courts would consider "all the circumstances known to the police to determine 
whether the apparent probability of an incriminating response is high enough to be characterized 
as 'reasonably likely.'" White, supra note 27, at 1224-25. 
78. Such a test, which allows courts to consider many factors, is reminiscent of the voluntari-
ness approach and would likewise raise all of the same difficulties. See infra note 164 (discussing 
voluntariness test). 
79. White, supra note 27, at 1232 ("If an objective observer (with the same knowledge of the 
suspect as the police officer) would, on the sole basis of hearing the officer's remarks, infer that 
the remarks were designed to elicit an incriminating response, then the remarks should constitute 
'interrogation.' "). 
80. See supra text accompanying notes 23-34 & 66 (suggesting the limited significance of 
police intent in the Innis context). 
81. White, supra note 27, at 1231 (emphasis in original). 
82. Id. at 1231-33. 
83. See supra notes 64-69 and accompanying text. 
84. See supra notes 66-68 and accompanying text. 
85. See White, supra note 27, at 1232-33. 
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cause police cannot reasonably be expected to know all of a suspect's 
peculiarities, White's objective observer has the same knowledge of the 
suspect as the police. 86 Unless the police should know something 
unique about a suspect, interrogation depends on the effect of police 
conduct on the average suspect. The test becomes an examination of 
whether an average person in the suspect's position would believe that 
police intended him to make an incriminating response. , 
Although White's analysis of the suspect's perceptions and what 
the police "should have known" appears correct, by phrasing his test 
in terms of intent, he risks the same problems produced by the Innis 
Court's language. Intent becomes too central to the analysis. Admit-
tedly, White's approach is within the bounds of Innis because he fo-
cuses on an objective observer's perceptions of intent rather than the 
officers' actual intent. 87 In most cases attention to perceptions of what 
the police "designed" will not prove a problem. Difficulties arise, 
however, in cases such as Innis, in which police have evoked incrimi-
nating statements by conduct that can be deemed to have some pur-
pose other than to elicit a response. In Innis, there is a plausible 
argument that an objective observer could conclude that the officer's 
remarks were made out of genuine concern for the risks posed by the 
hidden weapon. 88 The dangers of intent analysis in the interrogation 
context are that courts sympathetic to police interrogation can always 
find some other purpose for an officer's actions. By finding that the 
police did not intend to produce incriminating responses, courts could 
permit police practices that compel incriminating statements in viola-
tion of Miranda. 
A third interpretation of the Innis Court's language, advanced by 
Professor Yale Kamisar, avoids the pitfalls of intent analysis. 
Kamisar believes that the majority was focusing on the compelling 
nature of the practice and not on the probability of its success. 89 He 
notes that the words "reasonably likely" cannot be taken literally;90 
after all, if the police directly question a suspect, their likelihood of 
success is irrelevant. If police conduct prods a suspect to make an 
incriminating statement, it is the equivalent of interrogation regardless 
of the probability of success. Kamisar was concerned with "coercive" 
conduct by the police, "which is equivalent to 'express questioning' in 
terms of its coerciveness. " 91 This focus on compulsion, rather than on 
the government's purpose or design, properly recognizes that Innis is a 
86. See supra text accompanying note 79. 
87. See White, supra note 27, at 1232. 
88. See TRENDS, supra note 27, at 96. 
89. Kamisar, U.S. Law Week Remarks, supra note 40, at 37. 
90. Id. 
91. Id. at 37-38 (emphasis in original). 
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Miranda fifth amendment case.92 Because adversary proceedings 
against Innis had not begun, the Massiah and government purpose 
analyses are inapplicable.93 
Kamisar was also troubled by the Innis Court's "reasonably 
likely" language because the probability of success should not matter 
if a practice is not police interrogation. Interrogation, within the 
meaning of Miranda, requires that the compulsion be official compul-
sion. 94 Unfortunately, the truth of this observation is not readily ap-
parent from the Innis opinion. Innis assumed both police involvement 
and the suspect's awareness of that involvement.95 Nevertheless, all of 
the practices considered by Miranda 96 and Innis 91 involved obvious 
police action. The Miranda Court refers to the "police" component of 
interrogation throughout98 an:d states explicitly "[b ]y custodial inter-
rogation, we mean questioning initiated by law enforcement officers. "99 
The Innis test considers "words or actions on the part of police of-
ficers." 100 In effect, the requirement of official compulsion and the im-
portance of the suspect's perceptions mean that if the suspect is 
unaware of police involvement, then there is no interrogation within 
the meaning of Miranda. 
This discussion of the critiques of Innis should reinforce several 
key features of the decision. First, Stevens' reading of the majority test 
suggests the dangers of treating the "reasonably likely" language as 
support for probability analysis. Such a literal analysis gives courts 
too much room to apply subjective preferences. White's objective ob-
92. See supra text accompanying notes 41-43 & 49-51. 
93. See supra notes 23-34 & 42-45 and accompanying text 
94. See Kamisar, What is Inte"ogation?, supra note 24, at 53; Kamisar, U.S. Law Week 
Remarks, supra note 40, at 41-48. 
95. The Innis Court did not consider a situation in which a suspect was unaware of police 
participation. Innis himself overheard officers talking among themselves. 
96. In each of the cases before the Miranda Court, defendant was questioned by police of-
ficers, detectives, or a prosecuting attorney. 384 U.S. at 436-57. While a prosecuting attorney is 
not literally a police officer, she still enjoys state police powers and exercises official compulsion. 
For other forms of official compulsions, see Miranda, 384 U.S. at 450 (considering police interro-
gation manuals and practices discussed therein, all of which involve a suspect's awareness of 
police participation); 384 U.S. at 452 (considering "Mutt and Jeff" act, where police presence is 
clear); 384 U.S. at 453 (considering line-ups in which coached witnesses pick defendant as perpe-
trator or identify suspect as perpetrator of fictitious crimes; line-ups involve known police 
participation). 
97. See Innis, 446 U.S. at 300. Innis reviewed some of the police practices discussed in Mi-
randa, all of which involved obvious police participation. These included the use ofline-ups with 
coached witnesses and psychological ploys where officers would " 'posi[t]' 'the guilt of the sub-
ject,' to 'minimize the moral seriousness of the offense,' and to 'cast blame on the victim or 
society.' " 446 U.S. at 299. 
98. 384 U.S. at 445 ("interrogation . . . in a police dominated atmosphere"), 456 & 465. 
99. 384 U.S. at 444 (emphasis added). The Court also stated: "We are satisfied that all the 
principles embodied in the privilege [against self-incrimination] apply to informal compulsion 
exerted by /aw-enforcement officers during in-custody questioning." 384 U.S. at 461 (emphasis 
added). 
100. Innis, 446 U.S. at 302 (emphasis added). 
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server approach is useful for other reasons. His approach indicates the 
importance of the suspect's perceptions at the same time that it holds 
police only to what they should have known. By considering an objec-
tive observer's view of what the officer intended, courts can appreciate 
bow an average suspect would view the conduct. Because such a test 
is entirely objective, courts need not analyze the suspect's actual per-
ceptions or the officer's actual intent. Courts need only consider how 
facts known to the police about the actual suspect would affect the 
perceptions of an average suspect. Unfortunately, White's test places 
too much emphasis on intent. A consideration of Kamisar's analysis 
helps to redirect attention to the central concern of Miranda - that is, 
police compulsion. 
The limited relevance of police intent to Miranda analysis rests on 
the distinction between Massiah sixth amendment rights and Miranda 
fifth amendment protections. The distinction is partly formalistic. 
When the Supreme Court refused to extend Massiah to the pre-indict-
ment stage, it shifted to the fifth amendment in part because of con-
cerns that use of sixth amendment analysis would eliminate the use of 
confessions.101 A new and different test for the pre-indictment period 
helped reduce these fears. 
In addition, constitutional language lends force to the distinction. 
The fifth amendment specifies that no person "shall be compelled in 
any criminal case to be a witness against himself."102 The sixth 
amendment sets out the right to counsel more generally, stating only 
that the "accused shall enjoy the right . . . to have the Assistance of 
Counsel for bis defence." 103 The language of the fifth amendment pro-
tects an individual's right to be free from undue compulsion. The sub-
jective nature of the concept of compulsion suggests that a violation 
only occurs when an individual senses compulsion. Even if the gov-
ernment intends to produce an incriminating statement, a suspect's 
ignorance of government action keeps her free from the anxiety flow-
ing from official compulsion. Finally, as a practical matter, the fifth 
and sixth amendments involve different types of rigbts. 104 The fifth 
amendment protects a personal right that is violated when police act 
against an individual. It does not matter what police intend if the acts 
cause the individual to be aware of unconstitutional pressures. At the 
moment those pressures occur the right is violated. Miranda created 
rules designed to dispel such compulsion. The Miranda warnings, by 
reducing perceived compulsion, can thus eliminate fifth amendment 
101. See supra notes 30-32 and accompanying text. 
102. U.S. CoNST. amend. V. 
103. U.S. CoNST. amend. VI. 
104. See Loewy, Police-Obtained Evidence and the Constitution: Distinguishing Unconstitu-
tionally Obtained Evidence from Unconstitutionally Used Evidence, 87 MICH. L. REV. 907, 928 
(1989) (discussing the difference between the fifth and sixth amendments). 
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violations at the moment they might otherwise occur. The sixth 
amendment is more procedural, protecting the fairness of the adver-
sary process. The fairness of that process becomes an issue only after 
the commencement of adversary proceedings. · At that point, govern-
ment acts designed to interfere with the process, to upset the adversary 
balance, violate the constitution regardless of the suspect's awareness 
of the violation. It is the government's action, rather than the sus-
pect's perceptions of compulsion, that constitutes the violation. Thus, 
while fifth amendment Miranda analysis functions to dispel compul-
sion, sixth amendment doctrine is concerned with preserving the integ-
rity of the courts through deterring police misconduct. Consequently, 
sixth amendment analysis focuses on acts intended to produce incrimi-
nating responses. 
Taken together, this discussion and these critiques s_uggest a read-
ing of Innis that is consistent with Miranda.· Courts should consider 
whether an objective observer, knowing only what police should have 
known, would find that the suspect perceiyed official compulsion -
above and beyond the pressure inherent in custody-.to rn~e an in-
criminating .statement, 
II. THE SUBSEQUENT APPLICATION OF INNIS IN '11HE LOWER 
COUR~ 
Because cases implementing Innis deal with factually specific po-
lice practices, grouping cases according to certain. fact patterns consti-
tutes the most helpful way to analyze the impact of the Innis decision. 
Such classification reveals common methods of reasoning and demon-
strates what Innis has come to mean in practice. This section will look 
at those applications, dividing the cases based on similarities of fact 
patterns. · 
A. Friends and Relatives 
A number of cases consider the role offriends and relatives in elici-
ting incriminating responses from suspects in custody. Such a situa-
tion usually arises when either a relative asks to speak to the 
defendant105 or the suspect seeks to converse with the relative106 
(although in some cases the police bring about the meeting107). Even 
when the police arrange the meeting, however, most courts find that 
involving friends or relatives does not constitute interrogation. Unfor-
tunately, these courts appear to reach this conclusion for the wrong 
reasons. 
105. See, e.g •• Arizona v. Mauro, 481 U.S. 520 (1987); United States ex. rel Church v. 
DeRobertis, 771 F.2d 1015, 1017 (7th Cir. 1985). 
106. See, e.g., People v. Wojtkowski, 167 Cal. App. 3d 1077, 213 Cal. Rptr. 846 (1985). 
107. See, e.g., State v. Loyd, 425 So. 2d 710, 713 (La. 1983). 
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The Innis test, read literally, requires courts to consider what the 
police believe to be reasonably likely to elicit an incriminating re-
sponse. In cases where friends or relatives are involved, this reading 
directs courts to examine whether it was likely that the presence of 
friends or relatives would produce incriminating statements. But as 
Justice Stevens anticipated, the language of probability gives courts 
discretion to consider police intent - the officers' good-faith judgment 
as to what was likely to occur. 108 Indeed, in applying the Innis test, 
lower courts have shifted attention to police intent. If the police did 
not intend to get an incriminating response, then the lower courts are 
much less likely to find that an incriminating response was reasonably 
likely. 
This emphasis on intent indicates confusion between fifth amend-
ment analysis under Miranda and sixth amendment analysis under 
Massiah. Under Innis and Miranda the focus should be on the percep-
tion of the suspect regarding police compulsion. 109 However, the 
Supreme Court itself appears to have condoned the focus on intent 
and considerably confused the law of interrogation in Arizona v. 
Mauro. 110 There, the Court upheld the admission of a recording made 
when police permitted defendant's wife to speak with her husband. 111 
The prosecution used the tape to rebut respondent's insanity defense. 
The Court admitted that police "knew it was 'possible' that [defend-
ant] might make incriminating statements if he saw his wife." 112 Nev-
ertheless, the Court found that the practice was not one that police 
knew was "reasonably likely" to elicit an incriminating response. For 
the Court, it was significant that although the officers knew of the 
"possibility," they did not send Mrs. Mauro to see her husband for the 
purpose of producing such evidence. 113 Consequently, the opinion 
seemed to imply that there was no interrogation because Mrs. Mauro 
was not a government agent. 114 
This approach is incorrect because the government's purpose is an 
108. Innis, 446 U.S. at 314 &n.13 (Stevens, J. dissenting) ("Ifa suspect does not appear to be 
susceptible to a particular type of psychological pressure, the police are apparently free to exert 
that pressure on him despite his request for counsel, so long as they are careful not to punctuate 
their statements with question marks . • . . Under these circumstances, courts might well find 
themselves deferring to what appeared to be good-faith judgments on the part of police."). 
109. See supra notes 61-69 and accompanying text. 
110. 481 U.S. 520 (1987). 
111. Although a police officer was present during the meeting, the officer did not speak. 481 
U.S. at 527. 
112. 481 U.S. at 524. 
113. 481 U.S. at 522. In fact, it was Mrs. Mauro who requested the opportunity to speak to 
her husband. 
114. The Court emphasized facts that led it to conclude that Mrs. Mauro was not a govern-
ment agent At several points, the opinion states that the police were reluctant to allow the 
meeting, 481 U.S. at 522; 481 U.S. at 528 (tried to discourage her from talking to her husband). 
In addition, the Court found that the meeting was not desired by police as a means to get a 
confession, but was Mrs. Mauro's idea, 481 U.S. at 523-24. 
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issue in a Massiah-type case, but it is not an issue under an Innis anal-
ysis. Because Mauro was an Innis case (Mauro had not yet been in-
dicted), it should have made no difference what the government 
intended. Rather, the issue in Mauro should have been whether de-
fendant was subjected to official compulsion to confess. The Court 
should have considered Mauro's perception of pressure fl.owing from 
the police.115 Because Mauro's wife could not exert such official pres-
sure, her discussion with him should not have constituted police inter-
rogation 116 within the meaning of Miranda. 117 Moreover, it is 
irrelevant whether Mrs. Mauro was a government agent if Mauro did 
not view his wife as possessing official authority to compel his confes-
sion. Justice Powell's opinion failed to take advantage of an easy solu-
tion: without the police there is no police interrogation.118 The Court 
reached the correct result but the emphasis of its analysis confused the 
issues.119 
Other courts have also given undue weight to the government's 
purpose. The Seventh Circuit, in United States ex rel. Church v. 
DeRobertis, 120 applied a similar "intent" analysis. The DeRobertis 
115. See Kamisar, U.S. Law Week Remarks, supra note 40, at 36-48; supra notes 61-69 and 
accompanying text. 
116. The fact that Mauro was in custody, while certainly producing anxiety, could not tum 
the wife's discussions with him into interrogation. Innis requires a measure of compulsion above 
that inherent in custody. See supra notes 62-63 and accompanying text. In some circumstances, 
the wife could take on the air of authority such that her actions would constitute interrogation. 
See Kamisar, U.S. Law Week Remarks, supra note 40, at 47-48. If the wife had urged or begged 
Mauro to confess in front of the officer her actions may have taken on "the color of 'police 
blue.' " Id. at 47. Mauro would have perceived such a challenge, to display honor and decency 
by confessing, as coming from his wife and the officer. Also, the wife might have told Mauro 
that she was a government agent sent to get his confession. Under these circumstances, the wife's 
actions would become official compulsion, making her behavior interrogation. 
117. See supra notes 94-100 and accompanying text. 
118. The Mauro case is considerably complicated by the fact that an officer was present 
during the meeting between Mauro and his wife. As noted above, the presence of the officer and 
the tape recorder could have caused Mrs. Mauro's remarks to take on the "color of blue" and 
become interrogation. Supra note 116. In addition, interrogation would have occurred if the 
officer's participation had functioned to compel a confession - for example, if the officer had 
asked Mauro direct questions about the crime during the meeting. The Court, however, down-
played the importance of the officer's role, 481 U.S. at 523-24 (stressing that the officer was only 
there to insure the wife's safety and to maintain legitimate security concems);·481 U.S. at 527 & 
527 n.4 (stressing that the officer spoke to the wife and asked no questions about the crime or 
Mauro's conduct). It is fairly clear that the officer did not produce official compulsion above the 
level inherent in custody. For this reason, discussion has focused on the consequences of the 
wife's actions alone. For purposes of analysis, and apparently from the Supreme Court's point of 
view, it is as if the wife spoke to the suspect alone. 
119. The Court's Mauro opinion, while preoccupied with intent, can be read consistently 
with an analysis that properly considers the suspect's perceptions of official compulsion. The 
Court did discuss the coerciveness of the "interrogation environment." The majority also men-
tioned the relevance of defendant's viewpoint when told that his wife wanted to speak with him. 
The opinion suggests that Mauro could not have felt that he was being "coerced" by such a 
meeting and may have found no interrogation on this ground. 481 U.S. at 528-29. Unfortu-
nately, the Court's emphasis on intent distorted this otherwise correct analysis. 
120. 771 F.2d 1015 (7th Cir. 1985). 
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court held that detectives did not "interrogate" the defendant by put-
ting his older brother in the cell, although they knew that the older 
brother would urge the defendant to confess.121 The court did not find 
the incriminating statements "reasonably likely," though the results 
were foreseeable, because the police did not intend or designedly set 
out to achieve such results. 122 The Seventh Circuit justified its focus 
on intent by stating that the court in Innis was concerned with official 
trickery. It noted that the detectives in DeRobertis did not plant in the 
brother's mind the desire to elicit the incriminating response and did 
not initiate the idea of consultation.123 Thus, there was neither im-
proper intent nor official trickery. Although the court used the lan-
guage of probability, the analysis centered on intent. 
Rather than considering purpose, the Seventh Circuit should have 
examined defendant's perception of official pressure. Under such an 
approach, if the suspect did not know that he was dealing with a gov-
ernment agent, there would be no police pressure, inherent, informal 
or otherwise.124 The decision indicates the weakness of Innis' "reason-
ably likely" language. Even if the brother's actions were extremely 
"likely" to produce an incriminating statement, there would still be no 
police interrogation within the meaning of Miranda because the sus-
pect was unaware of official pressure.125 
The focus on police intent in the friends and relatives area would 
permit the admission of almost all confessions. Courts can always find 
innocent motives when the police permit (or in the case of minors re-
quire) a friend or relative to speak with the defendant. Such analysis 
will encourage the police to use the practice to get damaging informa-
tion and will not limit use of the practice to cases where official com-
pulsion is absent. 
Some decisions, however, emphasize a suspect's perceptions of 
compulsion, apppearing to follow more closely the meaning of Mi-
randa and Innis. The main concern of these decisions is whether the 
situation involves police conduct "which is equivalent to express ques-
tioning in terms of its coerciveness. " 126 They only find interrogation 
where there is compulsion - where the appeal of.a friend or relative 
takes on the "color of 'police blue' " 127 through the circumstances or 
pr~ence of an officer of the)aw.12s 
121. 77.1 F.2\1 at 1018-19. 
122. 771 F.2d at 1019. . 
123. 771 F.2d at 1019. 
124. See Hoffa v. United States, 385 U.S. 293 (1966); supra note 51 (discussing Hoffa). The 
case is like Hoffa in that the suspect did not know he was dealing with the police. 
125. See supra notes 94-100 and accompanying text . 
. 126. Kamisar, U.S. Law Week Remarks, supra note 40, at 38 (emphasis in original); see also 
supra notes 91-93 and accompanying text; Kamisar, What is Interrogation?, supra note 24, at 67. 
127. Kamisar, U.S. Law Week Remarks, supra note 40, at 47. 
128. Id. at 36-48. 
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Several state courts have correctly focused on the presence or ab-
sence of official compulsion, and not on police "intent." In People v. 
Wojtkowski, 129 the court held that an individual who was unaware of 
government involvement could not be thought to experience the pres-
sures of interrogation. The California Court of Appeals admitted re-
corded telephone conversations between a defendant and his wife 
(after defendant was arrested for raping her) because defendant did 
not know he was dealing with an agent of the government.130 
Wojtkowski highlights the distinctions between Miranda and Massiah-
type cases - the court itself distinguished Massiah. Massiah had in-
volved a defendant who did not know that he was dealing with the 
government;131 but because Massiah protections only arise after the 
beginning of adversary proceedings, they were not relevant to 
Wojtkowski. 132 Wojtkowski, a Miranda case, turned on the presence or 
absence of compulsion and properly found no constitutional violation 
where there was no official pressure.133 Similarly, in State v. Loyd, 134 
the Louisiana Supreme Court found no interrogation where the 
mother of defendant spoke to him outside the presence of police offi-
cers. The court noted that she was neither an officer nor agent of the 
law; thus, she could not imply that it would be so much the worse for 
him if he did not cooperate.135 Because the defendant did not know 
that he was dealing directly with the police he could not have felt 
undue official compulsion.136 These decisions suggest that the use of 
129. 167 Cal. App. 3d 1077, 213 Cal. Rptr. 846 (1985). 
130. 167 Cal. App. 3d at 1081, 231 Cal. Rptr. at 849. 
131. See supra text accompanying notes 23-34. 
132. 167 Cal. App. 3d at 1082, 213 Cal. Rptr. at 849. In discussing Massiah, the court noted 
that Massiah was premised on the accused's need to know that he or she was dealing with a 
government agent. Only by knowing that on~ was dealing with an adversary could a defendant 
appreciate that statements made could be used against him. However, in Wojtkowski, the de-
fendant's wife was also the victim; thus, her adversarial status put the defendant on notice that 
the statements could be used against him. See 167 Cal. App. 3d at 1082, 213 Cal. Rptr. at 849. 
133. The court in Wojtkowski rested its decision primarily on the absence of official pressure 
from the viewpoint of defendant. However, the court also noted that the police had not inten-
tionally created a situation where it was likely that the defendant would make incriminating 
statements. 167 Cal. App. 3d at 1082, 213 Cal.Rptr. at 849. The court did not find the state-
ments "reasonably likely," in part because the police did not intentionally set out to achiev~ such 
results. See 167 Cal. App. 3d at 1082, 213 Cal. Rptr. at 849. Thus, even courts that properly 
concentrate on the suspect's perceptions of compulsion can give too much sigliificance to intent. 
134. 425 So. 2d 710 (La. 1983). 
135. 425 So. 2d at 717. Defendant had no reason to believe that his right to control or cut off 
questioning was limited. For the court, the mere fact of custody did not.make his mother's 
presence menacing. The sanie observation about custody can be made in the jail plant case$. The 
mere fact of custody does not make a jail plant's presence menacing. See infra section 11.E. 
136. Similar reasoning can be found in State v. Pierce, 347 N.W.2d 829 (Minn. Ct. App. 
1984). The Pierce court considered compulsive pressure when it found that the absen.ce of a 
police officer during father-son discussions made the son's subsequent confession admissible. An 
officer had informed defendant's father of the extensive evidence against his son and tliat it would 
be better for defendant if he confessed. Apparently, 'the father, influenced by these remarks, 
convinced the son to confess. (Although the father's influence on defendant's behavior is unclear 
from the opinion, the Pierce court appears to have assumed that it contributed to the confession. 
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friends or relatives to elicit incriminating information will be allowed 
so long as there are not other factors that would make the discussions 
coercive.137 • 
Other courts, while correct in their attention to official compul-
sion, fail to evaluate the suspect's perceptions of that compulsion. In 
People v. Miller, 138 the mother of the defendant questioned him re-
garding his involvement in a robbery and felony murder. Though de-
fendant was in his mother's apartment, police officers were present 
when he made two incriminating statements. 139 The New York court 
determined admissibility by asking if the mother were acting as an 
"agent ... of the government" 140 with respect to each question. The 
first statement had been made in response to the mother's unprompted 
inquiry. Because at that time the mother was not an agent of the gov-
ernment, the statement had not been obtained as a result of improper 
"compulsion."141 
The defendant's second statement, however, occurred when the 
detectives, who had overheard the first response, asked the mother if 
the guns were in the apartment. When the mother relayed the ques-
tion to her son, defendant made an incriminating statement. 142 Here, 
defendant's mother had become an agent, her conduct becoming " 'so 
pervaded by governmental involvement that it los[t] its character as' " 
private conduct. 143 
The Miller court, while alert to the need for official pressure, failed 
to appreciate that the suspect must be aware of this official pressure. 
The court's discussion of government "agents" fails to appreciate the 
importance of the suspect's perceptions of official compulsion. 144 It 
347 N.W.2d at 832·33.) The court noted that the policeman's action was a less "disingenuous 
technique" than the one used in Innis because it did not involve direct contact between the officer 
and the defendant. 347 N.W.2d at 833. Pierce appropriately found no compulsion because no 
officer was present to give the father's actions the "color of blue." 
137. See supra notes 126-28 and accompanying text. These other factors include the pres-
ence or threats of police or statements by the relative that increase the suspect's perceptions of 
official compulsion. For example, interrogation might have occurred in Loyd if the mother had 
said to her son: "The Sergeant told me that if you do not cooperate, you are going to be in 
serious trouble." Such a statement increases the suspect's perceptions of pressure, flowing not 
directly from the relative, but from police. 
138. 137 A.D.2d 626, 524 N.Y.S.2d 727 (1988). 
139. 137 A.D.2d at 627, 524 N.Y.S.2d at 728. 
140. 137 A.D.2d at 628, 524 N.Y.S.2d at 729 (emphasis added). The opinion correctly stated 
that the protections against self-incrimination did not apply to "confessions elicited by private 
individuals." 137 A.D.2d at 628, 524 N.Y.S.2d at 729. Constitutional concerns would exist 
when private individuals act as "agents of the government or when government officials partici-
pate in those actions." 137 A.D.2d at 628, 524 N.Y.S.2d at 729 (emphasis added) (citations 
omitted). 
141. 137 A.D.2d at 629, 524 N.Y.S.2d at 729. 
142. 137 A.D.2d at 627, 524 N.Y.S.2d at 728. 
143. 137 A.D.2d at 629, 524 N.Y.S.2d at 730 (quoting People v. Ray, 65 N.Y.2d 282, 284, 
480 N.E.2d 1065, 1067, 491 N.Y.S.2d 283, 285 (1985)). 
144. The Innis test itself states that interrogation includes "words or acts on the part of the 
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does not matter that the mother was a government agent if the son 
could not view her conduct as official compulsion. If a mother's be-
havior is not police interrogation "in the eye of the beholder," it is not 
interrogation under Innis. 145 Because what a defendant does not know 
cannot affect his perceptions, the mother's status as an "agent" should 
have no bearing on the question of interrogation.146 Rather than con-
sidering whether the mother had become a government agent, the 
court should have asked whether the mother's act of relaying the 
detective's question caused the son to view the question as the 
equivalent of a direct question from the detectives.147 He could, after 
all, hear the officers asking the mother whether the guns were in the 
house. When his mother directly relayed the question, Miller might 
have considered it as coming from the officers and felt that they, not 
his mother, were demanding an answer. Ifhe had seen her question in 
this way, interrogation would have occurred regardless of the mother's 
status as an agent and the Miller court's result would have been cor-
rect.148 Unfortunately, by emphasizing the mother's status as govern-
ment agent, the court overlooked that Miranda turns on the suspect's 
perceptions and distorted the meaning of Innis. 
The errors of other courts are more basic in their failure to evalu-
ate the existence of compulsion. These courts improperly tolerate po-
lice compulsion in the form of threats to a suspect's friends. For 
example, in United States v. Thierman, 149 police detectives threatened 
to interrogate the defendant's girlfriend if he did not cooperate.150 
One officer later testified that he had looked at defendant while speak-
ing of interrogating the girlfriend and that he "guessed" he was trying 
to get defendant to respond. 151 Nevertheless, the court found "noth-
ing in the record to compel a finding that the police conversation was 
police," 446 U.S. at 302 (emphasis added). See supra note 35 (under Miranda concern is with 
pressure that police officers can bring to bear on a suspect); supra notes 116 & 124 and accompa-
nying text (importance of official compulsion). 
145. See supra note 61 and accompanying text (focus of Innis on the perceptions of the 
suspect). 
146. Kamisar, U.S. Law Week Remarks, supra note 40, at 41. 
147. Cf. Moran v. Burbine, 475 U.S. 412, 423 (1986) (no violation of Miranda where suspect 
did not know attorney was trying to see him; "even deliberate deception of an attorney could not 
possibly affect a suspect's decision to waive his Miranda rights unless he were at least aware of 
the incident"). Compare Escobedo v. Illinois, 378 U.S. 478, 481 (1964) (confession excluded 
where police told the suspect that his attorney did not want to see him). 
148. TRENDS, supra note 27, at 92-93 (Innis test should be reformulated to consider police 
conduct having the "same force and effect as a direct question"). 
149. 678 F.2d 1331 (9th Cir. 1982). 
150. When the defendant insisted on his lawyer's presence, one of the detectives left for the 
girlfriend's residence. The officers who remained discussed, in the presence of the defendant, the 
need to contact defendant's friends and family, and one officer commented that it was "too bad" 
that the girlfriend had to be involved. 678 F.2d at 1332-33. 
151. 678 F.2d at 1336. 
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more evocative than the one at issue in Innis. " 152 
The Thierman court failed to ask whether the police action was the 
equivalent of telling the suspect directly: "Unless you cooperate we 
will 'work on' your girlfriend." Clearly, any suspect would perceive 
this statement as official pressure, and conduct that affects a suspect in 
the same way should be deemed to be interrogation. Thus, the 
Thierman court ignored the dictates of Miranda and Innis. 
Courts that consider the role of friends and relatives in eliciting 
incriminating statements make several common errors. Some improp-
erly focus on police intent, which is the issue under Massiah, but not 
under Miranda and Innis. Others concentrate on whether the relative 
is an "agent" of the police, thereby disregarding the importance of the 
suspect's perceptions. Different courts erroneously permit police to 
threaten directly a suspect's friends in order to induce confessions. 
Such analysis is contrary to Innis' dictate that official compulsion be 
dispositive. In most circumstances, friends and relatives do not exert 
official compulsion and confessions that follow should be allowed. 
Only in rare cases will private behavior take on the "color of blue" and 
rise to the level of interrogation. 
B. Volunteered Statements and Follow-Up Questions 
Another line of cases that considers the meaning of interrogation 
under Innis involves police questions following a voluntary statement 
by the suspect. When these "follow-up" questions prompt incriminat-
ing responses, suspects have argued that the questions themselves con-
stitute impermissible police conduct. However, although direct 
questions are usually considered interrogation, the Innis Court stated 
th11;t voluntary statements are admissible. Justice Stewart's opinion re-
peated Miranda's finding that" '[v]olunteered statements of any kind 
are not barred by the Fifth Amendment and their admissibility is not 
affected by our holding today.' "153 
Unfortunately, Innis does not reveal how statements made in re-
sponse to police follow-up questions should be regarded. Logically, if 
a follow-up question and the subsequent response are viewed as part of 
the initial voluntary statement - as one event - they would fall 
under Innis' concession for "volunteered statements.'' If, however, the 
152. 678 F.2d at 1336. The opinion stated that fear of the involvement of family and friends 
does not create peculiar susceptibilities because such concerns are common to all, and given 
defendant's education and shrewdness, it was unlikely that he was susceptible to such pressures. 
678 F.2d at 1337. 
153. 446 U.S. at 300 (quoting Miranda, 384 U.S. at 478); see also, Miranda, 384 U.S. at 533 
(White, J., dissenting) ("Although in the Court's view in custody interrogation is inherently coer-
cive, the Court says that the spontaneous product of the coercion of arrest and detention is still to 
be deemed voluntary."). Again, the problem of taking the Innis language literally should be 
obvious. Voluntary statements, which Stewart finds always admissible, will often be the result of 
police behavior that was "reasonably likely" to elicit the incriminating statement. 
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follow-up question is analytically distinct from the initial statement, it 
should be treated as an independent direct question, the most obvious 
form of interrogation. 
Apparently guided by such logic, some commentators have as-
serted that responses to follow-up questions should be allowed if the 
questions are a "continuation" of the initial volunteered statement be-
cause they represent "neutral efforts" to clarify what has already been 
said.154 Once, however, the questioner attempts to enhance a suspect's 
guilt, police behavior becomes interrogation and the response is inad-
missible.155 This a_pproach implicitly recognizes the suspect's percep-
tions of compulsion. A suspect should not perceive official pressure 
when a question merely clarifies a voluntary statement. When, how-
ever, the examiner begins to hone in on the suspect's guilt, the level of 
intimidation increases, thus impermissibly compelling an individual to 
confess. 
Several cases that have admitted incriminating statements appear 
to follow this analysis. For example, in United States v. Egan, 156 the 
court allowed incriminating statements which were the product of 
"idle conversation" initiated by the defendant.157 At trial, the state-
ments were admitted into evidence after the court found that police 
follow-up was not interrogation. The opinion noted that there had 
been no "subtle compulsion" designed to produce an incriminating re-
sponse. In particular, the court noted that the officer's questions did 
not even relate to defendant's alleged crime; rather, the officer had 
m~rely participated in a conversation on an unrelated subject.158 
Other cases suggest that courts will not find interrogation where 
"the officer simply requested clarification"159 or explanation of some-
thing said voluntarily.160 Typically, courts hold that the police officer 
merely ~·continued the flow" of a conversation initiated by the defend-
154. W. LAFAVE & J. lsRAEL, supra note 1, at§ 6.7(d). 
155. Id. 
·.156. 501 F. Supp. 1252 (s:o.N.Y. 1980). 
157. 501 F. Supp. at 1268. 
158. 501 F.Supp. at 1267-68. The conversation involved defendant's restoration of a house, 
his work in the trucking business, and his home in Massachusetts. Defendant eventually com-
mented that his parents would be ashamed of him, which was, by implication, a confession. 
159. State v. Lfilnb, 213 Neb. 498, 503, 330 N.W.2d 462, 466 (1983). In Lamb, the defend-
ant, while in custody, asked a police officer, "How would you like it?" When the officer re-
sponded, "What do you mean by that?," the defendant answered "I have to do the cooking, 
washing, the laundry. And I got tired of it ... so I shot her." 213 Neb. at 501, 330 N.W2d at 
465. The officer's question was not considered interrogation because it simply requested a clarifi-
cation of the defendant's initial statement. Lamb, 213 Neb. at 503, 330 N.W.2d at 466. 
160. See, e.g., State v. Porter, 303 N.C. 680, 692, 281 S.E.2d 377, 385 (1981). In Porter, the 
arresting officer radioed his supervisor to inform him of defendant's apprehension. The supervi-
sor asked if the officer had recovered the stolen bank bag. The defendant overheard the question 
and stated "The bank bag is in the car." When the officer asked "What bank bag?'', defendant 
replied "The bag from the robbery." Porter, 303 N.C. at 683, 281 S.E.2d at 385. Since the 
officer's question only sought clarification, it was not interrogation. 
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ant. Such decisions recognize the logical significance of the fact that 
defendant began the conversation. Discussions initiated by defendants 
normally do not produce pressure above the level that is inherent in 
arrest and custody,161 despite limited police participation. 162 A sus-
pect who initiates discussion with police is less likely to feel official 
compulsion because he is likely to sense greater (albeit still limited) 
personal control over the exchange. 
At some point, however, an officer's follow-up question will begin 
to exert pressure above that inherent in arrest and custody. Courts 
using "continue the flow" analysis should find follow-up questions 
that increase a suspect's anxiety above this level to be interrogation. 
Thus, interrogation should be found when questions of clarification 
become direct accusations, made to confirm a defendant's guilt. 163 
Other courts fail to consider the suspect's perceptions and concen-
trate incorrectly on the officer's intent. 164 Courts sympathetic to inter-
rogation can always posit a permissible police intention. The task of 
161. See supra note 63 and accompanying text. 
162. See, e.g., Hill v. State, 470 N.E.2d 1332 (Ind. 1984). In Hill, the Indiana Supreme 
Court found that because the suspect bad started the discussion, his subsequent incriminating 
statement was voluntarily and freely made. There had been no "compelling influence" and the 
"statement was uncoerced." 470 N.E.2d at 1335. 
163. See, e.g., People v. Bodner, 27 Crim. L. Rep. (BNA) 2414 (July 10, 1980). In Bodner. 
the defendant came to the police and told them that his cousin had committed the crime. After 
speaking to the cousin, a police officer informed the defendant that he believed the cousin's ver-
sion of the facts and defendant confessed. The court found the confession inadmissible as the 
officer's statements constituted interrogation. Rather than a "neutral effort" to clarify what had 
been said, the policeman's statement was considered a "confrontation" - an accusation of lying 
- designed to close in on the suspect. 27 Crim. L. Rep. (BNA) at 2415. Since the suspect could 
sense increased government pressure, the conduct became interrogation. As both Miranda and 
Innis stated, to posit the guilt of the suspect is a form of interrogation. See Innis, 446 U.S. at 299 
(quoting Miranda, 384 U.S. at 450). 
164. Some of these courts incorporate intent as part of an "objective observer" approach. 
People v. Papile, 113 A.D.2d 776, 776-78, 493 N.Y.S.2d 366, 367-68 (1985). See supra note 79 
and accompanying text for a discussion of the "objective observer'' approach. They consider 
whether an objective observer would view the officer's respqnse as an unhesitating reply not 
intended to produce an incriminating response. Other courts consider intent as one of the factors 
in a "totality of circumstances" analysis. State v. Lamb, 213 Neb. 498, 505, 330 N.W.2d 462, 
466 (1983). 
The "totality of circumstances" approach was part of the "voluntariness" standard used to 
consider confessions prior to Miranda. While the test appeared to turn on the meaning of volun· 
tary - was the confession "voluntarily" made? - it in fact rested on a complex set of values 
that grew from conceptions of due process. The test barred admission of confessions that were 
(1) unreliable because of the police methods used to obtain them, (2) produced by offensive meth-
ods even though they were reliable, and (3) made by persons whose voluntary power was seri· 
ously impaired, though the confessions were trustworthy and not the product of conscious police 
wrongdoing. W. LAFAVE & J. ISRAEL, supra note 1, at§ 6.2. But see Colorado v. Connelly, 479 
U.S. 157 (1986), where Justice Rehnquist's majority opinion recast Townsend v. Sain, 372 U.S. 
293 (1963), by holding that involuntary confessions are only those procured through police mis-
conduct and that unreliability is not a matter of constitutional significance. It considered the 
"totality of circumstances" and scrutinized all surrounding circumstances, for no case turned on 
the presence or absence of a single criterion. 
As might be expected, the test was "inherently subjective,'' for it provided no adequate safe· 
guards for defendants or sufficient guidelines for the police or lower courts. Because judges could 
look at the totality of particular circumstances, they had unchecked discretion to consider their 
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characterizing follow-up as innocently intended is aided by the fact 
that such questions are often spontaneous replies to voluntary state-
ments by the defendant. Courts focusing on intent often consider the 
circumstances that prevented the formulation of impermissible design. 
Some courts reason that interrogation only occurs when the officers 
have had time to form such intent. Thus, where the question was a 
spontaneous response, the officer could not have had the opportunity 
to acquire the design or motivation to elicit incriminating state-
ments.165 Whatever the result, intent analysis confuses the Miranda 
and Massiah doctrines and ignores the importance of the suspect's 
perceptions. 
Follow-up situations pose severe difficulties for a defendant seeking 
to suppress a confession. A problem arises because a defendant's 
claim of police compulsion is weakened by the fact that defendant ini-
tiated discussion. In most cases, a follow-up question that merely 
clarifies the defendant's voluntary statement does not exert undue 
pressure and should not be considered interrogation.166 However, 
such questions become interrogation when they increase a suspect's 
anxiety by positing or attempting to establish a suspect's guilt. This 
subjective preferences. The vagueness of the term "voluntary" contributed to this difficulty. In 
the end, lower courts tended to resolve such disputes in favor of law enforcement. 
For discussion and criticism of the "voluntariness" test and consideration of "totality of cir-
cumstances" analysis, see generally MODERN CRIMINAL PROCEDURE, supra note 3 at 518-24; Y. 
KAMISAR, POLICE INTERROGATION AND CONFESSIONS 1-25, 73-75 (1980) (calling voluntariness 
test "unworkable"); o. STEPHENS, THE SUPREME CoURT AND CONFESSIONS OF GUILT, 71-119 
(1973); Herman, The Supreme Court, the Attorney General, and the Good Old Days of Police 
Interrogation, 48 OHIO ST. L.J. 733, 745-55 (1987) (discussing "the involuntary confession 
rule"); Schulhofer, Confessions and the Coun, 19 MICH. L. REV. 865, 869 (1981) (standard left 
police without guidance); Bator & Vorenberg, Arrest, Detention, Interrogation and the Right to 
Counsel: Basic Problems and Possible Legislative Solutions, 66 CoLUM. L. REv. 62 (1966) (term 
voluntariness provided inadequate guidance). 
165. See, e.g., State v. Porter, 303 N.C. 680, 694, 281 S.E.2d 377, 386-87 (1981) (emphasis 
added) (noting that there was no "opportunity to reflect or consider whether his query was reason-
ably likely to elicit an inculpatory remark"); People v. Papile, 113 A.D.2d 776, 776-78, 493 
N.Y.S.2d 366, 367-68 (1985) (emphasis added) (In an "unhesitating reply" to defendant's propo-
sal of a deal, the officer asked "What kind of a deal?" and "What are you talking about?"). 
Others courts will find interrogation did occur when the passage of time gave the officer the 
chance to form intent. See, e.g., People v. Bodner, 27 Crim. L. Rep. (BNA) 2414 (July 10, 1980) 
(Almost three hours passed between the time when defendant initiated contact with the police 
and the officer accused defendant of the crime. During that time, the defendant had been sent 
home and the officer had checked out the defendant's story and determined that it was false.). 
166. In Colorado v. Connelly, 479 U.S. 157 (1986), Justice Rehnquist considered when a 
confession is "voluntary" within the meaning of the Due Process clause, and in the process 
rewrote the history of confessions. The Court found admissible the confession of a mentally ill 
person who had approached an officer and volunteered the information that he had killed some-
one. Justice Rehnquist stated that the critical element in confession cases, for "over ... 50 
years,'' was the occurrence of police misconduct. 479 U.S. at 163. Voluntariness could not tum, 
he contended, on courts divining "a defendant's motivation for speaking or acting as he did even 
though there [had been] no claim that governmental conduct coerced his decision." 479 U.S. at 
165-66. However, see Justice Brennan's dissent which found the holding "inconsistent with the 
Court's historical insistence that only confessions reflecting an exercise of free will be admitted 
into evidence." 479 U.S. at 181 (Brennan, J., dissenting). Brennan's account seems a more accu-
rate portrayal of history, see supra note 164 and sources cited. 
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conclusion appropriately recognizes the significance of the suspect's 
perceptions of official compulsion. Unfortunately, some courts under-
estimate the defendant's perspective and focus on the officer's intent. 
C. ''Normally Attendant to Arrest and Custody" 
While Innis does not speak directly to whether all questions consti-
tute interrogation, 167 and no court has adopted such an absolute 
rule, 168 Innis does provide an exception for words and actions that are 
"normally attendant to arrest and custopy."169 This section will begin 
by discussing questions normally attendant to custody and suggesting 
that routine booking questions are not interrogation in most circum-
stances. It will then consider common arrest procedures and conclude 
that while police arrest practices might be due some deference, when 
those practices further not arrest but investigation, they are outside 
the Innis exception for actions attendant to arrest. 
While some courts consider nearly any questioning to be interroga-
tion, 170 the prevailing view is that questions that comprise part of the 
"booking process" are permitted.171 The latter position makes consid-
erably greater sense, for it would be absurd to suggest that every harm-
less question is interrogation. An officer cannot be thought to 
interrogate a suspect when, during booking, he asks: "Do you want a 
sandwich?" Consequently, so~e decisions appropriately note that Mi .. 
167. See United States v. Foskey, 636 F.2d 517, 522, n.3 (D.C. Cir. 1980) (referring to Innis' 
lack of guidance). 
168. See W. LAFAVE & J. ISRAEL, supra note 1, at§ 6.7(b). Under any interpretation qfthe 
Innis test, it would appear that some questions will be exempt from Miranda's limits. This is true 
for each of the three readings of Innis considered earlier in this Note. Under a "probability of 
success approach," not all questions are equally likely to produce incriminating responses. In· 
deed, many would seem unlikely to produce such evidence, see supra text accompanying notes 
54-60; infra text accompanying note 172. Under White's objective observer test, it is possible 
that an objective observer could find that some questions were not designed to produce damaging 
statements, see supra text accompanying note 61. In addition, certain kinds of questions, particu-
larly for routine booking information, are not likely to generate compulsive pressure, see supra 
text accompanying note 62. 
169. 446 U.S. at 301. 
170. In United States v. Downing, 665 F.2d 404 (1st Cir. 1981), for example, police asked a 
defendant, who had requested an attorney, to empty his pockets as part of police processing. 
After a question regarding his keys, the subject made an incriminating statement. The court 
found the question constituted interrogation, stating that once a suspect expresses a wish to 
remain silent, any statement taken cannot be otherwise than a product of compulsion. 665 F.2d 
at 406. The court suggested that the exception for action normally attendant to arrest does not 
apply to express questioning but only to its functional equivalent, 665 F.2d at 407. 
The Sixth Circuit, in United States v. Avery, 717 F.2d 1020, 1025 n.l (6th Cir. 1983), criti-
cized the First Circuit, stating that the First Circuit has "apparently taken the position that any 
form of direct questioning of a suspect in custody constitutes 'interrogation' under Miranda." 
For discussion of the view that once a suspect invokes the right to silence or counsel the police 
may not have any conversation in the defendant's presence that relates to the criminal activity in 
question, see Sonenshein, Miranda and the Burger Court: Trends and Countertrends, 13 Lov. U. 
CHI. L.J. 405 (1982). 
171. w'. LAFAVE & J. ISRAEL, supra note 1, at§ 6.7(b). 
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randa was concerned with questioning that enhances the pressures in-
herent in custody, which routine booking does not do. While booking 
questions may be unpleasant, they do not increase the compulsion per-
ceived by a suspect above the level inherent in custody. As a result, 
courts should not find interrogation in questions that are part of a 
routine procedure to secure biographical data. 
Some courts recognize this. A few reason that Miranda protects 
against interrogation of an investigative nature rather than against the 
obtaining of basic identifying data required for booking.172 Other 
courts consider a variety of factors which might bear upon a suspect's 
perceptions of official compulsion. These courts find it relevant that 
the booking questions do not relate to the criminal activity and that 
the defendant was not particularly susceptible to the questions. 173 
In some circumstances, even if police practices go beyond the re-
quest for biographical information, they may .be allowed if they appear 
as a necessary or routine part of police proc~sing and custody. Thus, 
no interrogation was found when, in an effort to determine how much 
an apparently confused suspect understood, an officer asked defendant 
if he knew why he had been arrested. In particular, the officer sought 
to establish that defendant understood his rights.174 
Some courts examine the particular procedure to determine if it is, 
in fact, part of normal booking practice. -Questions that are not rou-
tine ~hould be considered interrogation because they increase a sus-
pect's anxiety and perceptions of compulsion. In Lornitis v. State, 175 
for example, a police officer instructed several defendants to identify 
any personal items in a truck where police had discovered bales of 
marijuana. The court found interrogation becm1se there was no evi-
dence that the identification of personal belongings in seized vehicles 
was part of the normal booking or inventory process. 176 Similarly, a 
"sham" claim that a particular procedure was normally incident to 
arrest and custody ought not to immunize police behavior from Innis' 
requirements. 177 
The perception of compulsion should also increase if questioning 
172. See, e.g., United States v. Regilio, 669 F.2d 1169 (7th Cir. 1981). 
173. See 717 F.2d at 1024. The Avery court included police intent as one factor in its analy-
sis. Thus, the court found it relevant that the police did not use the booking procedures in order 
deliberately to elicit an incriminating response. As has been stated throughout, intent analysis 
confuses the Miranda and Massiah doctrines. See supra notes 164-65 and accompanying text. 
174. Colbert v. State, 654 P.2d 624 (Okla. Crim. App. 1982). 
175. 394 So. 2d 455 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1981). 
176. 394 So. 2d at 458. 
177. Under this view, People v. Reyes, 133 Misc. 2d 174, 506 N.Y.S.2d 541 (1986), was 
wrongly decided. In that case, the police successfully circumvented Miranda by calling their 
behavior a request for "routine identifying information." Police had prodded defendant for his 
identity over an extended period of time, challenging his assertions and investigating the proof 
that defendant offered as to his identity. The lengthy interview went beyond routine booking, 
and thus rose to the level of interrogation. 
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functions to investigate a suspect's guilt rather than merely identify 
the individual for processing. Police practices of this sort should be 
considered interrogation. Thus, in United States v. Poole, 178 the court 
found interrogation where questioning, although related to biographi-
cal data, worked to determine defendant's guilt. During the interview, 
FBI agents accused defendant of certain robberies and the response of 
a false name should have been foreseen. 179 The court considered po-
lice intent relevant to its analysis. "[I]n light of the investigatory pur-
pose of the interview," the court refused to separate the improper 
interrogation from the questions regarding identity.180 The decision 
properly recognized that investigative questioning is not a routine as-
pect of processing, but a component of interrogation. 
Legitimate routine practices may become interrogation due to pe-
culiar circumstances. It is fairly common for courts in these instances 
to apply a "totality of the circumstances" analysis, reminiscent of the 
voluntariness test. 181 These courts examine (1) the susceptibility of a 
particular suspect; (2) the officer's knowledge of that suspect; and (3) 
the particular crime at issue. 182 Thus, where an officer knew that a 
defendant's driver's license was in police custody, a state supreme 
court properly found that the only reason to ask defendant to locate 
his license was to elicit an incriminating response.1s3 
Although courts must look to the suspect's perception of compul-
sion, police intent is relevant to the extent that it sheds light on what 
police knew or should have known. 184 Innis does not hold officers ac-
countable for unique susceptibilities of which they could not possibly 
have known. 185 Officers are only responsible for what they should 
178. 794 F.2d 462 (9th Cir. 1986). 
179. 794 F.2d at 467. Poole had given a false name when FBI agents demanded his identity, 
date of birth and place of birth. The request for biograp~ical data was part of an interview that 
included showing defendant surveillance photos of the crime and asking about defendant's 
accomplices. · 
180. 794 F.2d at 466. 
181. See supra note 164 for discussion of voluntariness test. Some courts even use the lan-
guage of the "voluntariness test." In State v. Nelson, 459 So. 2d 510 (La. 1984), cert. denied, 
471 U.S. 1030 (1985), police questioned a defendant, in custody for driving while intoxicated, 
about the ownership of the car. The defendant responded that he had killed someone. The court 
found the statement admissible as it was "unresponsive" to the question asked, and "as voluntary 
as if he had walked into the police station and announced his guilt." 459 So. 2d at 514. Cases 
such as Nelson appear to consider the foreseeability of the response under the peculiar facts. 
182. See, e.g., United States v. Avery, 717 F.2d 1020, 1025 (6th Cir. 1983). 
183. State v. Ladd, 308 N.C. 272, 287, 302 S.E. 2d 164, 174 (1983). See also United States v. 
Disla, 805 F.2d 1340, 1347 (9th Cir. 1986) (where an officer knew that large amounts of cash and 
cocaine had been found at a certain apartment, asking defendant his residence was deemed 
interrogation). 
184. See supra notes 66-69 and accompanying text; infra notes 233-52 and accompanying 
text. 
185. Innis suggests that police are not responsible for unknown peculiarities. Justice Stewart 
stated: "[S]ince the police surely cannot be held accountable for the unforeseeable results of their 
words or actions, the definition of interrogation can extend only to words or actions on the part 
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have known about a suspect. For example, if officers could not possi-
bly have known about drugs stored at a defendant's house, there 
would be no interrogation when they asked the defendant where he 
lived. An objective observer knowing only what police should have 
known would not perceive such a question as excessive compulsion. 
Despite these considerations, it should not be forgotten that intent is 
of only limited relevance. Once a court concludes that police should 
have known about the drugs and that an objective observer with this 
knowledge would view a question about the defendant's address as 
compulsion to reveal incriminating information, it would be wrong to 
find no interrogation because police intended only to determine the 
defendant's residence. Where an officer is aware of a suspect's pecu-
liarities and those peculiarities make the question more compulsive, 
routine booking practices should be considered interrogation. Such an 
approach respects a suspect's perceptions and only holds officers to 
what they should have known. In this way police are not crippled in 
prosecuting arrestees and are able to ask routine questions that usually 
do not exert undue pressure. 
When arrests are involved, courts also respond to the added con-
cern of danger to t4_e safety of police officers. For example, in United 
States v. Bennett, 186 a policeman noted with some surprise the pres-
ence of a gun in the suspect's car. Though an incriminating response 
followed, 187 the Fifth Circuit found no interrogation. The court stated 
that the officer would have been derelict in his duty had he not warned 
others of the weapon. To call such action interrogation would "put 
absurd restrictions on the police."188 For the court, words or acts 
"necessary or appropriate to inform fellow officers of a potential threat 
to their own safety and that of others during the course of an arrest or 
custody, are 'normally attendant.' " 189 While the officer's exclamation 
might have evoked a confession, it did not increase the level of pres-
sure above that inherent in arrest. As a result, the statement might be 
deemed appropriately within the Innis exception.19° 
of police officers that they should have known were reasonably likely to elicit an incriminating 
response." 446 U.S. at 301-02 (emphasis added). However, in a footnote, the Court stated that 
any knowledge the police did have concerning a suspect's "unusual susceptibility ... to a particu-
lar form of persuasion might be an important factor in determining whether the police should 
have known that their words or actions were reasonably likely to elicit an incriminating response 
•... " 446 U.S. at 302 n.8. See also White, supra note 27, at 1233-1236, 1233 n.154 & 1235 n.162 
(suggesting that peculiar susceptibilities unknown to police are irrelevant); cf. TRENDS, supra 
note 27, at 93 (remarks of Professor Kamisar) (suggests finding interrogation only when incrimi-
nating response isforeseeable). 
186. 626 F.2d 1309 (5th Cir. 1980). 
187. As the officer pulled the gun from the car Bennett stated: "Yes, he had a damn gun and 
he was going deer hunting with it and there wasn't no law against him having a gun to go deer 
hunting •... " 626 F.2d at 1311. 
188. 626 F.2d at 1312. 
189. 626 F.2d at 1313. 
190. Bennett might also be characterized as a case involving police words of shock or sur-
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Courts appear equally tolerant of another common arrest scenario, 
in that they allow officers the opportunity to evaluate the nature of the 
situation they confront. Thus, in People v. Reyes, 191 an officer re-
sponding to a domestic dispute asked the parties, "What's going on 
here? It's pretty late."192 Though an incriminating response followed, 
the court found ·no interrogation. Rather, the court noted that Mi-
randa only prohibits confessions "genuinely compelled, namely, the 
result of coercion or overbearing of the will of the accused."193 Here 
the officer's actions were investigative rather than custodial, "designed 
to clarify the nature of the situation confronted."194 
Bennett and Reyes suggest that where police safety or the ability of 
officers to deal with an arrest is at stake, courts will find no interroga-
tion. In most circumstances, the questions involved pose no diffi-
culties because they create no compulsion above the level inherent in 
arrest. Courts that permit such practices appear to be in line with the 
dictates of Innis. 
But some courts improperly equate the immediate needs of arrest 
with the needs of an investigation. These decisions can completely un-
dermine Innis because the purpose of interrogation is to investigate 
crime. If the "needs of investigation" will permit practices that com-
pel confessions, Miranda and Innis become meaningless. 
The First Circuit appeared to make this mistake in United States v. 
Timpani 195• There, the court found no interrogation when FBI agents 
refused to allow the defendant to call his lawyer and insisted that he 
remain while they searched his apartment. The opinion conceded that 
the likely discovery of evidence during the search might produce in-
criminating statements. Nevertheless, the FBI action was necessary to 
an area-wide, coordinated search of loan-sharking operations. The 
court recognized as a valid concern the fear that defendant might 
warn others of the raid and prevent successful arrests.196 
Unfortunately, the court failed to recognize that the suspect's per-
prise. The situations in which these words prompt incriminating responses are considered below. 
See infra text' accompanying notes 278-303. Bennett appears to fall into both categories because 
the record is silent as to whether the remark was made to the other officers, to defendant, or to no 
one. 626 F.2d at 1310 n.4. If aimed at the officers, the statement can be seen as a warning 
normally attendant to arrest. If directed to no one, it can be viewed as a statement of shock or 
surprise. Since the court appears to analyze both of these possibilities, Bennett relates both to 
this section and section 11.F. See infra text accompanying notes 300-03. 
191. 133 Misc. 2d 174, 506 N.Y.S.2d 541 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1986). 
192. 133 Misc. 2d at 177, 506 N.Y.S.2d at 543. 
193. 133 Misc. 2d at 176, 506 N.Y.S.2d at 543. 
194. 133 Misc. 2d at 177, 506 N.Y.S.2d at 543. See also United States v. Castro, 723 F.2d 
1527 (11th Cir. 1984). In Castro an arresting officer smelling marijuana asked "What in the 
world is going on here?" 723 F.2d at 1529. Defendant responded with the offer of a bribe. The 
court found the statement admissible as it was totally unresponsive and thus volunteered. 
195. 665 F.2d 1 (1st Cir. 1981). 
196. 665 F.2d at 3. 
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ceptions of official compulsion was produced, not by custody alone, 
but by an investigation. Forcing the defendant to wait while his apart-
ment is searched for incriminating evidence is similar to the common 
police interrogation taqtic of confronting defendant with evidence 
against him. 197 Both practices are likely to compel confessions. The 
Timpani court permitted the action under tJ:i.e view that it was a proce-
dure necessary to arrest. There were, however, other ways for police 
to have assured arrest of defendant's conspirators. Defendant's pres-
ence did enhance the success of an investigation and functioned to in-
crease the level of compulsion above the level necessary to arrest. As a 
result, the officer's behavior was interrogation, not a practice "nor-
mally attendant to arrest." 
The Innis exception for questions normally atteqdant to arrest and 
custody rests on recognition of the practical necessities of police activ-
ity. Routine 'booking questions are essential to custody. Such ques-
tions, as long as they are in fact .routine,· norIQ.ally do not produce 
significant official compulsion above and beyond that inherent in arrest 
and detention. When, however, questions go beyond the scope of nor-
mal practice, they do increase the pressure above the level inherent in 
custody and should ·be viewed as proscribed interrogation. Courts 
should also be aware that a suspect's· peculiar susceptibilities can cause 
the individual to perceive routine questions as official pressure to con-
fess. Because an officer cannot be aware of every peculiarity, interro-
gation should only be found if the officer knows of these unique 
factors. · 
Police safety and the conduct essential to arrest may dictate .some 
de(erence to police procedure.· When, however, the pr?ctice furthers 
not arrest but jnvestigation, it falls outside the Innis exception and 
should be evaluated according to standard Innis analysis .. If the action 
increases a suspect's perceptions of compulsion, it should be deemed 
proscribed interrogation. 
D. ''Subtie Co'mpulsion" 
Another group of cases involves police practices that can be de-
scribed as "subtle compulsion."198 Innis itself falls into this category 
as do other cases involving conversations between police officers in the 
presence of the defendant. Ta~tics· of "subtle compulsion" also in-
clude situations where police confront defendant with incriminating 
evidence. · · 
197. See infra text accompanying notes 210-25. 
198. These are cases where it .cannot be argued that the practice was normally attendant to 
arrest or custody. See supra Section 11.C. These practices cannot be characterized as routine 
booking protedures because either they are not fu fact routine or they are totally unrelated to 
booking. They are also practices which cannot be· deemed necessary to arrest of the suspect. 
This is because either the suspect is already in custody, or arrest can be easily achieved without 
employing the questionable conduct. 
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Prior to Innis, there had been some confusion as to whether con-
duct in addition to direct questioning could constitute interroga-
tion.199 Innis made clear that tactics and methods that are the 
"functional equivalent" of direct questioning can be interrogation.200 
It does not follow, however, that all prompting is per se illegal,201 and 
courts have had considerable difficulty in this area. 
Because the Innis Court itself considered police methods of "subtle 
compulsion," the decision provides the most direct guide to analyzing 
these cases. The Innis decision suggests that the degree of "prompt-
ing" is relevant to a determination of interrogation. Interrogation 
should be found when the suspect perceives prompting as the func-
tional equivalent of express questioning. 
Thus, although Innis had been subjected to "subtle compulsion," 
this finding did not end the inquiry. The Court had to determine 
whether the damaging response was the product of words or acts rea-
sonably likely to elicit that response. 202 Words or acts do not become 
undue compulsion, noted the Court, when "the entire conversation ap-
pears to have consisted of no more than a few offhand remarks."203 
However, there might be interrogation if the police carry "on a 
lengthy harangue" in front of defendant and the comments become 
particularly evocative.204 Apparently, a direct appeal to a suspecfs 
conscience is only "subtle compulsion" and not sufficiently coercive to 
be deemed the functional equivalent of express questioning.205 
1. Situations Involving.Conversations Between Police Officers in the 
Presence of Defendants 
Analyzing how other courts have considered the use of conversa-
tions between officers in front of the suspect illustrates how the tactic 
can produce undue compulsion. For example, in People v. Jumper, 206 
an officer entered the police booking room where another officer asked 
the first if he knew the defendant. The first officer responded that de-
199. w. LAFAVE & J. ISRAEL, supra note 1, at§ 6.7(c). 
200. 446 U.S. at 300.01. 
201. See Edwards v. Arizona, 451 U.S. 477, 488 (1980) (Burger, C.J., concurring) (citing 
Rhode Island v. Innis, 446 U.S. 291 (1979)); Stahl v. State, 426 So. 2d 909, 916 (Ala. Crim. App. 
1982), cert. denied, 463 U.S. 1210 (1983). 
202. 446 U.S. at 303. 
203. 446 U.S. at 303. 
204. 446 U.S. at 303. 
205. One can certainly take issue with the Court's ultimate finding on the facts of Innis. The 
officer's "appeal to conscience" could be viewed as the equivalent of asking the suspect to "dis-
play some evidence of decency and honor" - a classic interrogation technique. See Innis, 446 
U.S. at 306 (Marshall, J., dissenting). However, one might accept the Court's characterization of 
the statements as a few offhand remarks. A few such remarks might not constitute an excessive 
degree of prompting. In any event, it should be clear that interrogation occurs when such re-
marks produce compulsion and thus become the functional equivalent of direct questioning. 
206. 113 Ill. App. 3d 346, 447 N.E.2d 531 (1983). 
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fendant was the individual who had attacked him earlier. The defend-
ant made an incriminating response that was later admitted. 207 
The Jumper court made much of the fact that here, as in Innis, 
there was a conversation between officers to which no response was 
invited.208 If that were true, then Jumper's response would, in fact, be 
nothing more than a voluntary statement and would be completely 
admissible. Unfortunately, the court failed to appreciate that the of-
ficer's remarks were significantly more compulsive than those consid-
ered in Innis. Jumper overheard not merely "oflhand remarks," but 
direct accusations of his guilt.209 From the suspect's perception, the 
officer's statement constituted the equivalent of the officer saying, 
"You did it. Now do you want to talk about it?" Clearly, such a 
statement would compel a confession. 
2. Confronting Defendants with Incriminating Evidence 
Another tactic considered by lower courts under Innis involves 
confronting a defendant with incriminating evidence. These cases 
should be relatively easy. Both Miranda and Innis state that to posit 
the guilt of the suspect is a form of interrogation.210 Because showing 
a defendant damaging evidence functions to accuse him of guilt, the 
practice obviously adds to the pressure to talk. Such conduct is the 
equivalent of saying, "We have found the following incriminating evi-
dence. Now do you want to talk about the crime?" It follows that 
police interrogate a suspect any time they confront that suspect with 
incriminating evidence. 
Several decisions have recognized that these practices constitute 
interrogation. These courts recognize that the level of compulsion in-
creases when a police practice shifts from "inquisitorial" action to "ac-
cusatorial" behavior. Thus, confronting a defendant with 
discrepancies in his story was found. to be interrogation.211 
Similarly, courts have correctly found interrogation where police 
· presented defendant with "apparently overwhelming inculpatory evi-
dence in the form of written witnesses' statements and oral explana-
tions."212 Others have found interrogation after officers showed the 
defendant various police reports, implying the threat of prosecution.213 
These cases correctly find interrogation in such circumstances because 
207. 113 Ill. App. 3d at 349, 447 N.E.2d at 533. 
208. 113 Ill. App. 3d at 350, 447 N.E.2d at 534. 
209. This is significant in other contexts, see supra text accompanying notes 155, 163 (dis-
cussing positing the guilt of the suspect as a form of interrogation). See also infra text accompa-
nying note 211. 
210. Innis, 446 U.S. at 299 (quoting Miranda, 384 U.S. at 450). 
211. People v. Savory, 105 Ill. App. 3d 1023, 435 N.E.2d 226 (1982). 
212. State v. Uganiza, 702 P.2d 1352, 1355 (Haw. 1985). 
213. In re Interest of Durand, 206 Neb. 415, 421-22, 293 N.W.2d 383, 387 (1980). The 
concurrence in Durand appears to have applied the voluntariness approach finding interrogation 
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the conduct posits the guilt of the suspect and undoubtedly increases 
the perception of pressure.214 
As with other fact patterns discussed in this Note, courts should 
consider whether an objective observer with same knowledge of a sus-
pect as police would view a police practice as compelling an incrimi-
nating response. Thus, Lewis v. State, 215 a Florida case where the 
Court of Appeals considered a defendant's familiarity with police 
techniques in finding no compulsion, was wrongly decided. Under a 
totality of circumstances analysis,216 the court found that because of 
defendant's long felony record, he could not have perceived that he 
was being coerced by police when they showed him incriminating in-
formation.217 Admittedly, the Lewis court's analysis did, to a degree, 
resemble the proper approach. The court considered the suspect's per-
ceptions218 of official compulsion,219 in light of what was known about 
Lewis' prior record and familiarity with police techniques. But the 
court underestimated the degree of compulsion and overestimated the 
suspect's ability to withstand police pressure. A practice is not any 
less compulsive because a suspect is familiar with it. To conclude 
otherwise is to suggest that any suspect with a prior record can be 
interrogated because familiarity breeds a strengthened resolve to resist. 
Despite his prior record, Lewis was still confronted with police acts 
that communicated, "We know you're guilty. Want to talk about it?" 
The fact that Lewis made incriminating statements indicates that he 
could not resist official pressure. Both Miranda and Innis made clear 
that positing the guµt of the suspect is interrogation.22° Consequently, 
anytime police confront a defendant with .irtcriminatirtg evidence, in-
terrogation occurs. Lewis should be no exception. 
becaiise the responses were "involuntary." See 206 Neb. at' 415, 293 N.W.2d at 387 (Boslaugh, 
J., concurring); supra note 1.~ (discussing voluntariness test). 
214. Similar opportunities for abuse exist w~en a polygraph is involved. In one case, the 
Fifth Circuit held that telling defendant that he.had failed a lie detector test was interrogation. 
At the time of the statement, the test was not yet 'completed. The court properly appreciated that 
it is a common psychological ploy, which Innis itself recognized, 446 U.S. at 300, to "posit the 
guilt of the subject." Henry v. Dees, 658 F.2d 406, 410 (5th Cir. 1981). See also Weisberg, supra 
note 10, at 21-24. 
215. 509 So. 2d 1236 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1987), cert. denied, 108 S. Ct. 2025 (1988). , 
' ' . 
216. The court found that a robbery and attc;mpted murder suspect was not interrogated 
when police showed him a video tape of the robbery which included footage of the shooting. 
Since the suspect had a long and serious felony record, was familiar with police techniques and 
had engaged in levity during the showing, the court concluded that Lewis had not been coerced 
to confess. 509 So. 2d at 1237. 
217. The decision indicates the problem with totality of circumstances analysis. By incorpo-
rating a broad' range of factors, a court can justify a coercive practice on the grounds that a 
suspect has the ability to endure police compulsion. See supra note 164 (discussing totality of 
circumstances analysis). 
218. 509 So. 2d at 1237. 
219. 509 So. 2d at 1237. 
220. Innis, 446 U.S. at 299 (quoti.ng Miranda, 384 U.S. at 450). 
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Other courts err by completely failing to appreciate the signifi-
cance of the suspect's perception of compulsion. They improperly fo-
cus on the intent of the police, which should be of only limited 
relevance.221 These courts fail to find interrogation where the officer 
did not intend an incriminating response. 
. But the officer's desire to "inform" a defendant has no bearing on 
the suspect's perceptions of official compulsion. Courts will always be 
able to justify tactics which function to improperly compel confessions 
as efforts to aid the suspect's decision to cooperate. A whole line of 
cases permit such practices on the ground that the defendant has the 
right to know the charges he faces or the strength of the case against 
him. 222 These courts often argue that such information will permit a 
suspect to make an intelligent decision as to whether to remain 
silent.223 
The problem with this argument is that it permits a coercive prac-
tice under the guise of aiding a defendant's informed decision. 224 Pres-
suring a suspect to cooperate is the functional equivalent of 
interrogation and is no less coercive because the officers did not intend 
to produce an incriminating response. Rather, interrogation should be 
found when "informing the defendant" would be perceived as an argu-
ment by the officer that defendant should .confess. 225 
Other decisions more clearly demonstrate the absurdity of this fo-
cus on police intent and the degree to which some courts go to admit 
confessions. Under an intent analysis, they allow police to inform de-
fendant of the procedural developments of his case. In one case where 
use of the "tough-guy, soft-guy"226 routine was alleged, the court 
found no interrogation when a detective stopped by defendant's cell on 
221. See supra notes 61-69 ~ci accompanying text. . 
222. See, e.g., United States v. Guido, 704 F.2d 675 (2d Cfr. 1983); Hawkins v: United States, 
461 A.2d 1025 (D.C. 1983), cert. denied, 463 U.S. 1052 (1984); Stahl v. State, 426 So. 2d 909 
(Ala. Crim. App.), cert. denied, 463 U.S. 1210 (1982). 
223. See, e.g., Guido, 704 F.2d at 675; Hawkins, 461 A.2d at 1031; Peopl~ v. Ferro, 63 
N.Y.2d 316, 472 N.E.2d 13, 19; 482 N.Y.S.2d 237, 243 (1984) (Jasen, J., dissenting); cert. denied, 
472 U.S. 1007 (1985) (describing placing stolen furs in front of defendant's cell as "little more 
than simple disclosure of information which.might, in fact, contribute to an intelligent ex1:rcise of 
his judgment"). · 
224. See, e.g., Guido, 704 F.2d 675 which aptly demonstrates the notion that such "informa-
tion" can produce a "decisfon to cooperate." In Guido, officers were discussing the benefits of 
cooperation with the defendant. In the cour:se of the discussion the officers "merely supplied ... 
information regarding the crime he was suspected of committing, in response to [defend;mt's] 
own questions." 704 F.2d at 677. The court found no interrogation, pointing out that the dis-
cussion was not "designed to elicit" incrimiftating information and there was no evidence that 
Guido was peculiarly susceptible to the appeal. 704 F.2d at 677. 
225. Other courts make the same mistake even though they recognize thatjnforming a de-
fendant of the charges against him can be the equivalent of positing the suspect's guilt. Such 
courts allow this well established interrogation technique because the officer liad an ·innocent 
intent. Hawkins, 461 A.2d at 1030. · 
226. See Weisberg, supra note 10, at 24 (describing the" 'friend and enemy' act in which two 
interrogators alternate, one sympathetic and the other .unfriendly"). 
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his way out to tell defendant that he intended to extradite him for 
murder.227 The court noted that the officer's only motive was his be-
lief that defendant had the right to know he would be extradited.22s 
The decision underestimated the fact that the officer used the opportu-
nity to increase the suspect's anxiety. In the course of their brief meet-
ing, he told the defendant that in the state where he would be tried the 
death penalty was a possibility.229 While the statement might be 
thought merely to inform defendant of his status, it obviously in-
creased the pressures inherent in custody. 
This is not to say that all efforts to alert defendant to procedural 
developments should be or have been considered interrogation. In 
some circumstances, the information might be considered a routine 
and necessary part of custody. Thus in Tally v. State, 230 the court 
found that merely telling the defendant that another police depart-
ment wanted to question him about a theft was not interrogation.231 
The result was correct because while such information increases a sus-
pect's anxiety, Innis requires a measure of compulsion above that in-
herent in custody.232 Circumstances of custody may often require 
transferring suspects between various institutions and police depart-
ments and police behavior associated with that legitimate practice can 
be considered inherent to custody. When, however, an officer suggests 
that defendant could get the death penalty, the officer improperly adds 
to the pressures of custody. As a result, that practice should be con-
sidered interrogation. 
3. Alternative Uses of Intent in Subtle Compulsion Cases 
While intent should be of limited significance, Innis does not com-
pletely prohibit consideration of police design. Innis stated that intent 
might have "bearing on whether police should have known that their 
words or actions were reasonably likely to evoke an incriminating re-
sponse. "233 Some cases follow this direction and incorporate intent in 
a way that is closer to the dictates of Innis. These cases appear to 
employ Professor White's "objective observer" approach.234 
227. Stahl v. State, 426 So. 2d 909, 913 (Ala. Crim. App. 1982). 
228. 426 So. 2d at 915. 
229. 426 So. 2d at 913. 
230. 455 So. 2d 186 (Ala. Crim. App. 1984). 
231. 455 So. 2d at 188. 
232. 446 U.S. at 301. 
233. Innis, 446 U.S. at 301-302 n.7 ("This is not to say that the intent of the police is irrele-
vant, for it may well have a bearing on whether the police should have known that their words or 
actions were reasonably likely to evoke an incriminating response. In particular, where a police 
practice is designed to elicit an incriminating response from the accused, it is unlikely that the 
practice will not also be one which the police should have known was reasonably likely to have 
that effect."). 
234. See supra note 79 and accompanying text. 
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One such court, in Commonwealth v. Brant, 235 found interrogation 
when, after a suspect refused to answer questions, an officer interjected 
that his co-defendant had already made a statement.236 Although the 
court considered the fact that the officer's acts were designed to evoke 
an incriminating response, 237 the opinion made clear that the test was 
"objective."238 Apparently, the c::ourt considered an objective ob-
server's perception of what the officer intended. At the same time, the 
decision acknowledged that while intent may be relevant, it is by no 
means "conclusive."239 
Under this "objective" approach, the suspect's perspective is not 
lost because, if an objective observer would view the police action as 
designed to compel a confession, a suspect would sense undue police 
pressure. Thus, the officer's intent becomes important only to the ex-
tent that it sheds light on the likelihood that the suspect would per-
ceive compulsion. 
In most circumstances, analysis of objective intent, which might be 
considered an "objective policeman" standard, will not cause diffi-
culties. One can easily find that the remarks of the officer in Brant 
were designed to evoke an incriminating response. 240 Difficulties will 
arise, however, in cases where police have induced incriminating state-
ments by conduct which can be deemed to have some purpose other 
than to produce a response.241 For example, in Brant, it is not impos-
sible to argue that the officer intended only to alert the suspect to de-
velopments in his case and not to get an incriminating statement. A 
court which accepted this argument would permit a practice which 
clearly compelled a confession on the grounds of this innocent 
intention. 
In light of these difficulties, how then is one to make sense of the 
Innis Court's discussion of intent? The answer lies in appreciating the 
Court's instruction to use intent to get at what the police knew or 
should have known. Innis makes clear that police cannot be "held 
accountable for the unforeseeable results of their words or actions."242 
Thus, a court should consider whether an objective observer knowing 
only what the police should have known would view police action as 
official compulsion to confess. In practice, this means that courts 
must evaluate not what the officers literally intended,243 but what they 
235. 380 Mass. 876, 406 N.E.2d 1021 (1980), cert. denied, 449 U.S. 1004 (1980). The opin-
ion came down shortly after Innis. 
236. 380 Mass. at 882, 406 N.E.2d at 1025-26. 
237. 380 Mass. at 883, 406 N.E.2d at 1026. 
238. 380 Mass. at 883-85, 406 N.E.2d at 1026-27. 
239. 380 Mass. at 883, 406 N.E.2d at 1026. 
240. 380 Mass. at 883, 406 N.E.2d at 1026. 
241. See supra note 88 and accompanying text. 
242. 446 U.S. at 303. 
243. These cases can be confusing because courts that use "intent" correctly and those that 
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knew or should have known about the suspect. 
Such analysis has significant ramifications when the defendant has 
peculiar susceptibilities. If an officer could not have known that the 
suspect's personality made him susceptible to a particular pressure, 
then no interrogation can occur when the officer's actions produce an 
incriminating response. Accordingly, some courts consider only the 
susceptibilities known to the police.244 Thus, in Hawkins v. United 
States, 245 the fact that the defendant was mentally ill was irrelevant 
because the officer did not know that this made the defendant particu-
larly susceptible.246 
The Hawkins decision demonstrates the proper use of intent be-
cause it focuses on what the officer should have known about the sus-
pect. Such an approach asks whether an objective observer who knew 
what police should have known would view the practice as official 
compulsion to confess. The observer's viewpoint would in most cases 
reflect the suspect's perception of the police action. 
Some suspects, however, do not share the objective observer's view 
of the police action because of their unusual susceptibilities. Typi-
cally, these individuals would feel undue compulsion because from 
their point of view, the officer intends them to talk. Under Innis, how-
ever, officers are not responsible for peculiar susceptibilities of which 
they are unaware.247 Thus, the Hawkins court properly decided the 
case of the mentally ill defendant. Although that defendant perceived 
official compulsion, most individuals would not.248 
- Sometimes, however, courts use this analysis when the suspect's 
susceptibilities are not unusual. They focus on the officer's perceptions 
do not both employ the language of "intent." The distinction is that correct decisions, while 
discussing intent, are really analyzing what the officer knew or should have known. 
244. See, e.g., Hawkins v. United States, 461 A.2d 1025 (D.C. 1983); State v. Stahl, 426 So. 
2d 909 (Ala. Crim. App. 1982), cert denied, 463 U.S. 1210 (1983); PeoP,le v. Benjamin, 101 
Mich. App. 637, 300 N.W.2d 661 (1980). 
245. 461 A.2d 1025. 
246. 461 A.2d at 1031. Cf. Colorado v. Connelly, 479 U.S. 157 (1986) (admitting statement 
made by mentally ill person as "voluntary" because there had been no police misconduct). 
247. But see Brewer v. Williams, 430 U.S. 387 (1977), a Massiah case, where the Detective 
who gave the now famous "Christian Burial Speech" knew that defendant was a former mental 
patient and knew also that he was deeply religious. Since Williams was a Massiah case, see supra 
notes 23-34 and accompanying text, it turned on whether the officer "deliberately and designedly 
set out to elicit information." 430 U.S. at 399-401. Williams focused on the officer's intent 
directly and considered the manner in which the officer used knowledge of the suspect's suscepti-
bilities to produce a confession. But since Innis is a Miranda case, intent is of more limited 
relevance. Once it is clear that an officer knew or should have known of a peculiar susceptibility, 
analysis must concentrate on the suspect's perceptions. Courts must consider how a-suspect with 
those qualities would respond to the police action at issue. 
248. The Innis Court stated: "Any knowledge the police may have had concerning the unu-
sual susceptibility of a defendant to a particular form of persuasion might be an important factor 
in determining whether the police should have known that their words or actions were reason-
ably likely to elicit an incriminating response from the suspect." 446 U.S. at 302 n.8. Neverthe-
less, police are not responsible for the "unforeseeable" results of their acts. 446 U.S. at 303. 
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of the suspect's condition and ignore the perceptions of an average 
suspect. They seem to allow a coercive practice because an officer felt 
that this suspect could "handle it." For example, in People v. Reyes, 249 
the New York Court of Appeals considered the officer's knowledge 
concerning the suspect. Defendant had been arrested after a domestic 
dispute and at the time of arrest had appeared fairly agitated. In the 
station house, police walked the defendant in handcuffs past iris wife, 
causing him to make an incriminating statement. 250 The court found 
the statement admissible despite the defendant's contention that the 
police had deliberately created a confrontational situation. The opin-
ion emphasized that the suspect "no longer appeared to be in an ex-
cited or agitated state."25 1. The court ignored consideration of the 
potentially compulsive nature of the confrontation. Because the sus-
pect "looked calm" the officer c.ould not have anticipated the result 
and thus could not have intended to produce an incriminating 
response. 
A focus on the officer's appraisal of the suspect thus becomes an-
other way courts examine the officer's subjective intent. Such apprais-
als of "calmness" can be used to justify what might otherwise be 
coercive behavior. The court might have considered whether an objec-
tive observer with the same knowledge of the suspect as police would 
view the officer's acts as official compulsion to confess. Such analysis 
gets at the average suspect's perceptions, but only holds officers to 
what they shpuld have known. Reyes, however, involved not unknown 
peculiarities, but the response of an average suspect to a potentially 
evocative confrontation.252 Because officers should know how average 
suspects respond, the fact that the suspect looked calni should be 
irrelevant. 
Unfortunately, the Reyes court emphasized that because the sus-
pect looked calm, the police could not have intended to produce an 
incriminating response. This ,kind of analysis will allow many coercive 
tactics under the claim that the suspect appeared to the officer able to 
endure the pressure. Thus, the Reyes court should have considered 
the suspect's perception of the confrontation rather than the officer's 
intention. 
• 249 •. 133 Misc. 2d 174, 506 N.Y.S.2d 541 (1986). 
250. As defendant passed his wife, he declared, " 'I'll be out tomorrow. They can't do any-
thing to, me because I'm your legal husband. When I get out tomorrow, I'll finish what I started, 
and you'll get one right between the eyes.'" 133 Misc. 2d at 176, 506 N.Y.S.2d at 543. 
251. 133 Misc. 2d at i77, 506 N~Y.S.2d at 543-44.· 
252. Admittei:lly, the confrontation in Reyes might not have produced undue official confron-
tation. The wife was not a government official and her presence alone is not enough to produce 
interrogation. This Note takes greater issue with the analysis than the result. 
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4. Distinguishing Between First and Second Level Miranda 
Protections 
Some of the "subtle compulsion" cases may suggest a way to give 
content to the distinction between first and second level Miranda pro-
tections following the Supreme Court's blurring of those distinctions 
in Arizona v. Mauro. 253 As noted, first level protections exist before a 
suspect is given Miranda warnings and before he invokes the right to 
counsel, whereas second level protections begin once a suspect invokes 
these rights. Analysis under the two levels should differ. Under the 
first level, the question should be whether the police interrogated the 
suspect. Conversely, under the second level, the issue should be 
whether the police "scrupulously honored" the rights asserted.254 In 
Mauro, the Supreme Court blurred !his distinction by finding that the 
police do scrupulously honor the rights of the suspect when they do 
not engage in interrogation. 255 
Some lower courts applying Innis appear to have presaged the ana-
lytic confusion of the Mauro ruling.256 However, courts may be able 
to continue recognizing some distinction between the two levels of 
protection through a heightened sensitivity to the presence of compul-
sion in instances where Miranda rights have been asserted by a defend-
ant. An example of how this might work is provided by two decisions 
- People v. Ferro 257 and United States v. Gay. 25s 
In Ferro, the court held that the police interrogated defendant 
when they placed stolen furs, confiscated from a co-defendant, in front 
of defendant's cell.259 When it considered the need to scrupulously 
honor a suspect's rights once invoked, 260 the opinion found that the 
police did not "scrupulously honor" defendant's rights when they en-
gaged in interrogation.261 
253. 481 U.S. 520 (1987). 
254. See supra note 40 and sources cited therein (discussing first and second level Miranda 
protections). 
255. See supra note 40. Some critics have taken issue with the Court's failure to recognize 
the importance of the distinction. See, e.g., Kamisar, U.S. Law Week Remarks, supra note 40, at 
31-36. However, since this Note focuses on lower court decisions, a fuller critique of Mauro is 
beyond its scope. The Note can only suggest how lower courts might evaluate first and second 
level protections since Mauro is valid law. 
256. See, e.g., State v. Uganiza, 702 P.2d 1352, 1354-55 (Haw. 1985) (finding that the police 
"scrupulously honored" defendant's right where they did not engage in interrogation). 
257. 63 N.Y.2d 316, 472 N.E.2d 13, 482 N.Y.S.2d 237 (1984), cert. denied, 472 U.S. 1007 
(1985). 
258. 774 F.2d 368 (10th Cir. 1985). 
259. 63 N.Y.2d at 319, 472 N.E.2d at 14, 482 N.Y.S.2d at 238. The court commented that 
the Miranda rule was designed to counteract the coercive pressures of the custodial setting. Re· 
jecting the relevance of intent, the court stated that an objective observer possessing the same 
knowledge of the suspect as the police would have concluded that the action was reasonably 
likely to elicit an incriminating response. Id. 
260. 63 N.Y.2d at 322, 472 N.E.2d at 16, 482 N.Y.S.2d at 240. 
261. 63 N.Y.2d at 324, 472 N.E.2d at 17, 482 N.Y.S.2d at 241. Critics of Mauro should also 
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In Gay, the police also confronted defendant with physical evi-
dence when they held up a tin and defendant responded, "That's co-
caine too."262 However, the Gay court distinguished Ferro and found 
no interrogation. The difference between the two situations was that 
Gay, unlike Ferro, had not invoked his rights before being confronted 
with the evidence. 263 
Although Gay involved first level Miranda protections and Ferro 
involved second level protections, both cases asked the same question 
- was the suspect interrogated under Innis? While Gay mentioned 
, the "scrupulously honored" language, it incorporated those considera-
tions into the definition of interrogation. As noted, it found interroga-
tion when the police did not scrupulously honor defendant's rights. 
Consequently, Gay might appear to restate the Mauro approach. 
But Gay and Ferro illustrate that some lower courts - while not 
asking a different question - do alter their approach to finding inter-
rogation when second level Miranda protections are at stake. Thus, 
both the Ferro and Gay courts asked whether the police action rose to 
the level of interrogation. However, where second level protections 
were at issue - where the defendant had invoked his or her rights -
the Ferro court may be more willing to find that police practices con-
stitute interrogation. 
The courts in Ferro and Gay asked the same question, but analyzed 
the results differently. Critics of Mauro would take issue with this 
approach, and would contend that when second level protections are 
at stake, interrogation is not the issue.264 But given that Mauro is (for 
now) good law, courts must give the distinction between first and sec-
ond level Miranda protections continued vitality through other means. 
The pragmatic approach suggested by Ferro and Gay may provide one 
method. 
Overall, an analysis of the tactics of "subtle compulsion" must 
consider the level of compulsion involved in police behavior. Police 
practices become interrogation when a suspect would perceive official 
pressure above the degree inherent in custody. When "prompting" 
becomes the functional equivalent of express questioning, any response 
that follows should be ~admissible. 
object to the Ferro opinion. Following the pre-Mauro approach, the issue should have been 
whether the police conduct was the equivalent of saying: "We have recovered the stolen furs 
from one of your accomplices. So you still want to remain silent in light of that development?" 
Cf. Kamisar, U.S. Law Week Remarks, supra note 40, at 31-36. Such analysis would have rec-
ognized that officers must "scrupulously honor'' rights that have been asserted. 
262. 774 F.2d at 371. 
263. The court also distinguished Ferro because the police confronted Gay at his car and not 
in a cell. Further, the police may not have known what was in the tin, whereas in Ferro they 
knew the items were stolen. But these two distinctions do not appear as important to the court as 
the fact that the defendant had not invoked his rights. 774 F.2d at 379, n.23. 
264. See Kamisar, U.S. Law Week Remarks, supra note 40, at 31-36. 
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Intent may be of limited significance when the suspect has unusual 
susceptibilities. By considering an objective observer's perception of 
the officer's intent, a court holds the officer responsible only for what 
he should have known. However, in most cases, any examination of 
police intent confuses Massiah and Miranda analysis. Such an ap-
proach typically permits improper official compulsion under the guise 
of the officer's innocent intent. 
E. Use of the ''Jail Plant" 
Another common police tactic that courts have examined under 
Innis is the "jail plant." Typically, police place an undercover agent in 
the defendant's cell in an effort to elicit incriminating responses. 
Courts that consider this tactic interrogation err because neither Mi-
randa nor Innis should apply to the undercover agent situation. 
Innis extended Miranda to police methods that are equivalent to 
express questions "in terms of [their] coerciveness."265 However, in-
terrogation turns not on the mere existence of pressure, but on the 
suspect's perceptions of official compulsion. Because a suspect is una-
ware of an undercover agent's identity, a jail plant produces no inher-
ent or informal police compulsion. For this reason, no "police 
interrogation" should be found within the'meaning of Miranda.· One 
commentator has correctly observed: "[I]f it is not 'custodial police 
interrogation' in the eye of the beholder, then it is not such interroga-
tion within the meaning of Miranda."266 
Unfortunately, Innis' "reasonably likely to elicit" standard, if read 
literally, would reach the undercover plant,267 and lower courts have 
acted accordingly. Several state courts have erroneously found the use 
of the jail plant to be interrogation. For example, in State v. McMul-
lan, 268 the court reached this result by focusing on whether it was rea-
sonably likely that such an agent would produce incriminating 
information. In his concurrence, Judge Smith objected that the jail 
plant tactic should be allowed because it involved no "police coer-
cion." A court, he argued, should not find interrogation merely be-
cause a defendant "ignore[s] [his] counsel's advice through cupidity, 
stupidity, boastfulness, or remorse."269 Nevertheless, Judge Smith felt 
bound by precedent (the language of Innis in particular) to view the 
jail plant as a form of interrogation.270 
Other state courts, while correctly realizing that the degree of com-
265. Id. at 41 (emphasis in original). The Innis Court referred to Miranda throughout its 
opinion. See, e.g., Innis, 446 U.S. at 300-01. 
266. Kamisar, What is "Interrogation?" supra note 24 at 65. 
267. W. LAFAVE & J. ISRAEL, supra note l, at§ 6.7(c). 
268. 713 S.W.2d 881 (Mo. Ct. App. 1986). 
269. 713 S.W.2d at 884 (Smith, J., concurring). 
270. 713 S.W.2d at 884 (Smith, J., concurring). 
April 1989] Interrogation Under Innis 1117 
pulsion is dispositive, have erred in their analysis of the kind of com-
pulsion that Miranda prohibits. In Holyfield v. State, 271 the Nevada 
Supreme Court began by applying Innis literally, stating that the po-
lice should know that use of a jail plant is reasonably likely to elicit an 
incriminating response. However, the opinion went on to address the 
issue of coercion, stating that while coercion was the concern of Mi-
randa, the presence of an authority figure was not necessary for a situ-
ation to constitute coercion. The court found that mere confinement 
can produce a coercive atmosphere, increasing a suspect's anxiety.272 
The environment of custody itself made defendant more "likely to 
seek discourse with others to relieve [t]his anxiety."273 Because police 
could control and select a suspect's companions, they could exploit 
opportunities to elicit unfairly incriminating information.274 Conse-
quently, the court deemed the use of the jail plant to be interrogation 
in all circumstances. 
However, as the dissent pointed out, this reasoning ignores that 
Innis requires "a measure of compulsion above and beyond that inher-
ent in custody itself."275 Where a suspect does not know that the plant 
is a government agent, the added level of compulsion is missing and 
interrogation should not be found. A literal reading of the Innis test 
does require "._ourts tp view jail plant tactics as interrogation. A jail 
plant can always be considered "reasonably likely to elicit" incrimina-
ting information. But reading Innis literally is inappropriate when an-
alyzing a situation beyond the scope of the Innis Court's reasoning. 
Innis assumed awareness of police presence without which undue offi-
cial compulsion cannot exist from the suspect's perspective. 276 The 
suspect's perceptions are critical.277 Because a defendant is unaware 
of a jail plant's identity, the tactic must be deemed outside the scope of 
Innis and should not be considered interrogation. 
F. Implied Questioning and Exclamations 
Another line of cases involves police statements that are not direct 
questions; but concern casual conversations between the police and the 
defendant. On their face, many appear to involve "innocuous" re-
marks and Innis itself makes clear that the "police surely cannot be 
held accountable for the unforeseeable results of their words or ac-
271. 101 Nev. 793, 711 P.2d 834 (1985). 
272. 101 Nev. at 801, 711 P.2d at 839. 
273. 101 Nev. at 801, 711 P.2d at 845-46 (quoting White, supra note 10, at 604-05 (quoting 
Dix, Undercover Investigations and Police Rulemaking, 53 TEXAS L. REv. 203, 230 (1975))). 
274. 101 Nev. at 801, 711 P.2d at 839 (citing White, supra note 10, at 605). 
275. 101 Nev. at 811, 711 P.2d at 848 (Steffen, J., dissenting) (quoting Rhode Island v. Innis, 
446 U.S. 291, 300 (1980) (Holyfield's emphasis omitted)). 
276. See supra notes 94-100 and accompanying text. 
277. See supra notes 61, 109 & l lS-19 and accompanying text. 
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tions."278 Nevertheless, some of these innocuous remarks can lead to 
incriminating evidence and rise to the level of interrogation. 
An accusatorial statement is one form of indirect questioning that 
courts recognize can potentially constitute interrogation.279 However, 
many police statements are not as direct or are buried in pleasantries 
and their evocative nature is less apparent. Only by recognizing the 
compulsive nature of any accusation by a police officer can courts ap-
preciate the extent to which such statements constitute interrogation. 
Some courts do appear to have reached this conclusion. In Matter 
of Albert R., the California Court of Appeals found that telling a de-
fendant: "That was sure a cold thing you did ... , selling him that hot 
car," represented the functional equivalent of interrogation.280 The 
court noted that Innis prohibited not only express questioning but 
"implied questioning." Once defendant had invoked the right to re-
main silent, further conversation concerning his arrest or charges 
should have ceased.281 The court made clear that it was irrelevant 
that the officer had not intended to obtain such a response. The casual 
remark was seen as a "flagrantly accusatorial" statement. 282 
Other courts agree that where casual remarks tum to accusations, 
they rise to the level of interrogation. In People v. Burson, 283 the Illi-
nois Court of Appeals considered a case in which an officer, who was a 
friend of the suspect, said: "Now, Jerry, you know better than to drive 
that car."284 The statement produced an incriminating response.285 
Although spoken in a friendly manner, the officer's words posited de-
fendant's guilt and attempted to elicit comment from defendant as to 
why he had committed the act.286 
Both the Albert R. and the Burson courts properly recognize that 
accusations by an officer can be interrogation despite the friendly na-
ture of the exchange. These decisions are especially appropriate in 
light of the fact that a friendly and concerned attitude in questioning 
suspects is a common method of police interrogation. By pretending 
to sympathize with a suspect, police are often able to elicit incriminat-
ing statements.287 
The effectiveness of this technique would appear to be enhanced 
278. 446 U.S. at 301-02. 
279. See supra notes 155 & 161 and accompanying text. 
280. Matter of Albert R., 112 Cal. App. 3d 780, 783, 169 Cal. Rptr. 553, 555 (1980). 
281. 112 Cal. App. 3d. at 790, 169 Cal. Rptr. at 556. 
282. 112 Cal. App. 3d. at 793, 169 Cal. Rptr. at 558. 
283. 90 Ill. App. 3d 206, 412 N.E.2d 1160 (1980). 
284. 90 Ill. App. 3d at 208, 412 N.E.2d at 1162. 
285. Defendant had replied, "Yes, I know but can't you give me a break?" 90 Ill. App. 3d at 
208, 412 N.E.2d at 1162. 
286. 90 Ill. App. 3d at 210, 412 N.E.2d at 1163. 
287. See lnbau, supra note 5, at 19; Weisberg, supra note 10, at 23-24. 
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when the officer and defendant are friends. Consider, however, State 
v. lkaika, 288 where an officer who was an old friend of the defendant 
said: "What's happening? Must be heavy stuff for two detectives to 
bring you down here?"289 The court admitted the incriminating re-
sponse that followed, reasoning that the response was unexpected be-
cause the officer's statement was merely a "pleasantry" or 
"greeting. "290 
The court failed to appreciate that although the officer was a 
friend, his statement represented an accusation and direct question 
from an official source that was likely to increase the suspect's anxiety. 
The decision reflects the common error of allowing direct questions by 
police, which function to compel confessions, because of the friendly 
nature of the situation. 
In other situations, courts will not, find expressions of sympathy to 
rise to the level of interrogation. Thus, in United States v. Voice, 291 
two separate expressions of concern for the suspect, only remotely 
connected with the crime, were held not to constitute interrogation. 
In both instances it appeared that expressions of concern were not part 
of a series of additional questions, but rather were isolated inci-
dents. 292 The court noted that the "verbal conduct more resembled 
the 'offhand remarks' the Innis Court condoned than the 'lengthy ha-
rangue' the Court censured."293 
Some courts consider these cases through a "totality of circum-
stances" analysis. 294 In United States v. Hackley, 295 the court held 
that a confession made in response to the direct question of "what he 
was going to do in relation to this offense"296 was admissible. There 
had been no interrogation, concluded the court, because the statement 
followed a casual conversation about defendant's cousin. 297 The court 
stated that it "must look to the totality of the circumstances" to deter-
mine if the admission was "made voluntarily."298 According to the 
court, in the "context and setting" in which it was asked, defendant's 
response exceeded the answer that the question anticipated. 299 
288. 698 P.2d 281 (Haw. 1985). 
289. 698 P.2d at 283. 
290. 698 P.2d at 284-85. 
291. 627 F.2d 138 (8th Cir. 1980). 
292. In one incident, the officer noticed that the suspect appeared upset and sought to con-
sole him by telling him that "everything would be alright." In another incident, an officer asked 
the defendant why he was not taking his epilepsy medication. 627 F.2d at 144. 
293. 627.F.2d at 145. 
294. See supra note 164. 
295. 636 F.2d 493 (D.C. Cir. 1980). 
296. 636 F.2d at 497. 
297. 636 F.2d at 498. 
298. 636 F.2d at 499. 
299. 636 F.2d at 499. See also State v. Jackson, 351 N.W.2d 352 (Minn. 1984), considering a 
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Thus, a direct question concerning the crime at issue did not con-
stitute interrogation in the context of a casual friendly conversation. 
Such an approach appears to raise many of the problems of the volun-
tariness analysis. 300 As a friendly attitude will rarely be found an ob-
jectionable practice, incriminating reactions will usually be found 
admissible.301 This would seem to encourage creative police trickery. 
Other situations in which police words do not involve questions 
concern exclamations by police officers that produce incriminating re-
sponses. In one case a court found admissible voluntary statements 
made in response to a policeman's statement of surprise: "There is a 
gun in the car. " 302 The court noted that the statement was not 
designed to elicit an incriminating response but was an exclamation -
a natural reaction - which the officer could not have considered rea-
sonably likely to elicit an incriminating response. 303 
The court's analysis shifted the focus from the suspect's percep-
tions of coercion to the officer's intent - what the officer designed. 
The court suggested that shock or surprise prevented an officer from 
forming an improper intent. As a result, the dispositive question be-
came one of characterizing the remark. A determination that the re-
mark was one of surprise ended the inquiry.304 But by finding no 
interrogation in these circumstances, courts ignore the perceptions of 
the suspect and focus on the state of mind of the officer. Courts 
should instead consider how the suspect perceived an officer's excla-
mation. 305 If Bennett could view the officer's statement as directed at 
conversation between an officer and a jailed defendant who were watching television together. 
The officer told defendant to change the channel and the two then watched a news story on the 
crime of another inmate. Defendant suggested that the inmate should receive the death penalty 
for such a crime. The officer responded that if defendant had committed the crime of which he 
was accused he could be executed. 351 N.W.2d 352. The confession that followed was ruled 
admissible. The Jackson court used what it called a "totality-of-the-circumstances" test. 351 
N.W.2d at 355. Here, the officer was not looking for an answer. The remark had been spontane-
ously made and not in connection with interrogation. 
300. See supra note 164. 
301. For discussion of concern over the offensiveness of the practice as a goal of the volunta-
riness approach, see supra note 164. 
302. United States v. Bennett, 626 F.2d 1309,1310 (5th Cir. 1980) (footnote omitted). 
303. 626 F.2d at 1312. 
304. But see Harryman v. Estelle, 616 F.2d 870 (5th Cir. 1980) (en bane), a pre-Innis case 
refusing to undertake the characterization exercise. That court noted that the rigidity of Mi-
randa was its strong point. 616 F.2d at 873. It stated that the Miranda Court thought it neces-
sary to avoid the factual difficulties inherent in an inquiry as to whether a police question was 
asked in an attempt to elicit incriminating statements or asked out of shock or surprise. 616 F.2d 
at 874. 
305. For purposes of analysis, the discussion in this section assumes that the officer's excla-
mation was not normally attendant to arrest. See supra notes 186-94 and accompanying text 
(discussing concerns of police safety during arrest). As noted earlier, because the facts surround-
ing the remark were not fully set out in the opinion, it is difficult to classify the officer's state· 
ment. See supra note 190. If the statement functioned to warn other officers of the weapon and 
was necessary to the officer's safety during the arrest, then the statement would be normally 
attendant to arrest and excepted from the Innis definition of interrogation. See supra notes 186-
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him and the equivalent of a forceful demand: "Is there a gun in your 
car?" then interrogation would have occurred. Conversely, an objec-
tive observer might conclude that there is no way to perceive the state-
ment as calling for an answer. While the latter might have been the 
case and consequently the Bennett result may have been correct, a fo-
cus on police intent distorted proper Innis analysis. 
Cases involving indirect questions and police exclamations indicate 
the failure on the part of many courts to consider the suspect's percep-
tions of official compulsion. Indirect questions are often permitted be-
cause of the friendliness of the exchange, regardless of the suspect's 
view of the officer's statement. In the case of police exclamations, 
courts focus almost exclusively on the officer - his intent or state of 
mind. In both situations, courts would do better to concentrate.on the 
suspect's perceptions of official compulsion. The officer's supposed 
kindness or intent should be irrelevant. 
III. RECONCILING INNIS AND MIRANDA WITH THE 
SIX FACT SITUATIONS 
Miranda was concerned with the inherent compulsion of police in-
terrogation of those in custody.306 In clarifying the meaning of inter-
rogation, Innis focused on the perceptions of the suspect.307 Whil~ the 
language of Innis is ambiguous, courts should apply the test consis-
tently with the spirit of Miranda. The impact of the police conduct on 
the suspect's mind should be the focus. Thus, courts must consider 
whether the police behavior is such· that an individual will feel the 
authority of the state pressuring him or her to reveal incriminating 
information.308 Courts should consider whether an objective observer; 
knowing only what police should have known, would ·find that the 
suspect perceived official compulsion -· above and beyond the pres-
sure inherent in custody - to make an incriminating statement. 
Such an analysis would not require police to be accountable for the 
unforeseeable results of their words or acts. 309 The approach would 
also be consistent with Innis' language. If an objective observer would 
view the practice as signmcantly adding to the pressure, the police 
should also realize that the act is reasonably likely to elicit an incrimi-
nating response. The analysis can be applied to each of the six fact 
patterns considered in this Note. · 
94 and accompanying text. Alternatively, if it was just an excited utterance, unrelated to police 
arrest procedures, or was directed at Bennett, then it was outside the exception for procedures 
normally attendant to arrest and should be considered under standard Innis analysis. While the 
former was assumed, supra section 11.C, this section assumes the latter. 
306. See supra text accompanying notes 41-53. 
307. 446 U.S. at ~01-02. 
308. See Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 476-78 (1966); Kamisar, U.S. Law Week Re-
marks, supra note 40, at 41. 
309. See Innis, 446. U.S. at 301-02. . 
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In cases involving friends and relatives, the approach addresses the 
common error of courts misdirecting their evaluation of compul-
sion. 310 Courts tend to examine these practices in terms of the pres-
sure exerted by the relative alone. This problem results from the 
language of Innis, which asks what the police should know is reason-
ably likely. For this reason, courts seeking to address pressure from 
relatives, while still staying within the language of Innis, ask whether 
the police intended that the relative would elicit an incriminating 
response.311 
But Miranda and Innis are concerned with official pressure - "po-
lice blue" pressure312 - and not the pressure of the relative alone. 
Thus, courts must consider whether a relative's plea takes on the air of 
authority such that a suspect would feel the official compulsion.313 
This is consistent with Miranda and the language of Innis because it 
gets at the suspect's perceptions of official pressure. At the same time 
it avoids the analysis of intent which is relevant to Massiah but not to 
fifth amendment cases.314 
Volunteered statements and follow-up questions should also be an-
alyzed under an approach which focuses on the suspect's perceptions 
of official compulsion.315 In practice, this requires courts to allow 
questions that are a continuation of the initial volunteered statement 
and represent neutral efforts to clarify what has been said. Questions 
that attempt to enhance defendant's guilt, however, should be 
prohibited. 316 
This approach is consistent with an examination of the suspect's 
perception of compulsion. When an officer's questions go from "con-
tinuing the flow" to "closing in on the suspect's guilt" (pinning down 
the defendant; knocking out possible defenses; or raising the degree of 
guilt) the officer's questions become the functional equivalent of inter-
rogation in the mind of the suspect. The analysis thus allows totally 
volunteered statements at the same time that it gets at the compulsion 
of police action that is the focus of Miranda. 
The "normal-to-arrest-and-custody" exception should call on 
courts to determine whether the practice truly is routine and neces-
sary. 317 Routine requests for biographical data, while unsettling, will 
probably not add significantly to the pressure generated by custody. 
310. See supra text accompanying notes 105-128. 
311. See supra text accompanying notes 108-125. 
312. Kamisar, U.S. Law Week Remarks, supra note 40, at 47. 
313. See id. at 40-48. Only in rare instances will private behavior take on the "color of blue" 
and rise to the level of interrogation. See supra note 116. 
314. See supra notes 28-34 and accompanying text. 
315. See supra text accompanying notes 153-91; W. LAFAVE & J. ISRAEL, supra note 1, at 
§ 6.7(d) (suggesting the outlines of this approach in the follow-up situation). 
316. w. LAFAVE & J. ISRAEL, supra note 1, at§ 6.7(d). 
317. See supra text accompanying notes 167-73. 
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However, excessive behavior has been allowed under the guise of this 
exception. 318 
Moreover, under certain specific circumstances, routine proce-
dures may produce undue compulsion. Thus, courts should carefully 
consider police knowledge of the suspect's particular situation. 319 In-
terrogation should be found where an observer, knowing what the po-
lice knew about the suspect, would be aware that defendant would 
view the question as official compulsion. A court must make certain 
that the police practices do not "reflect a measure of compulsion above 
and beyond that inherent in custody itself."320 
Again, in the subtle compulsion area321 courts will do best to con-
sider an objective observer's perception of official compulsion. Where 
police conversations in front of the defendant produce incriminating 
responses, courts must be sensitive to the pressures exerted on the sus-
pect. Clearly, when the subject of the officer's discussion is the defend-
ant's guilt, an observer would perceive official compulsion. 
Confronting the defendant with incriminating evidence should almost 
always be considered interrogation, because it functions to posit the 
suspect's guilt. In all subtle compulsion cases, courts should direct 
analysis away from the intent of the police that has tended to domi-
nate lower court decisions. Intent should only be used to get at what 
police knew or should have known. 
The use of the jail plant should not even be considered under In-
nis. 322 Innis focused on the perceptions of the suspect of official com-
pulsion. Because a suspect is unaware of a jail plant's identity, the jail 
plant exerts no such official pressure. As a result, an objective ob-
server, while aware of some prodding, could not find that a jail plant 
produces the kind of pressure that was the concern of Innis. 
Finally, in cases involving implied questions and exclamations323 
courts should consider, not the officer's intention or demeanor, but the 
suspect's perceptions. They should examine whether an objective ob-
server could find that the officer's words called for an answer. Direct 
accusations are a typical form of interrogation and should not be per-
mitted because the officer assumed a friendly attitude. An objective 
observer would sense the need to respond to police expressions of 
kindness and sympathy. In addition, statements of shock or surprise 
can be interrogation, even though the officer did not have the opportu-
nity to form impermissible intent. If an objective observer could con-
318. See supra text accompanying notes 175-80. 
319. See supra text accompanying notes 181-85. 
320. Innis, 446 U.S. at 300 (footnote omitted). 
321. See supra section 11.D. 
322. See supra section 11.E. 
323. See supra section 11.F. 
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elude that the statement was directed at the suspect and demanded a 
response, interrogation should be found. 
One error common to each of these six categories is a preoccupa-
tion by lower courts with police intent. Many decisions dealing with 
the question of what constitutes "interrogation" shift analysis from the 
perceptions of the suspect to the intent of the officer. This misdirec-
tion may result from the fact that the test is phrased in terms of likeli-
hood of success, and from the Innis Court's concession that intent is 
relevant to likelihood. Thus, lower courts often look at an officer's 
intent by considering his or her perceptions of the likelihood of dama-
ging responses. 
Unfortunately, courts often consider intent not as only one factor 
but as the central feature of their analysis. When such a court first 
finds that an officer did not intend to induce an incriminating state-
ment, it then easily finds that the officer did not know that his actions 
were reasonably likely to elicit an incriminating response. Courts thus 
can use the likelihood language to justify decisions that often turn on 
whether the police practice was "designed" or "intended" to produce 
an incriminating response. · 
Because intent is of only limited relevance under Innis and Mi-
randa, these courts are confusing Miranda fifth amendment analysis 
with Massiah sixth amendment analysis. · Under the Massiah ap-
proach, analysis turns on the police officer's intent. But Massiah 
comes into play only after judicial or adversary proceedings have be-
gun. 324 Innis and Miranda are concerried with the period before the 
commencement of these proceedings. Courts err by considering Innis-
type cases under a Massiah-type analysis. As a result, they often per-
mit police compulsion that should be interrogation under Miranda. 
This is not to say that all courts misapply the standard. But while 
many reach proper results for the right reason, many c,ome to the 
wrong resul~ ,or to the proper result through incorrect analysis. An 
approach that looks to an objective observer's perceptions of the im-
pact of the practice on the suspect would help produce results that are 
consistent with the spirit of Miranda, with the language of Innis, and 
with each other. 
IV. CONCLUSION 
This Note has treated lower court decisions on the basis of the 
factual scenarios they present because Innis demands a case-by-case 
analysis. Such a grouping is useful because common concerns emerge 
within each group. But while the method of analysis should be differ-
ent in each type of case, in all cases courts should concentrate on the 
suspect's perception of official compulsion. Courts should avoid too 
324. See supra notes 26-34 and accompanying text. 
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great a focus on intent that, while central to sixth amendment analysis, 
is of only limited significance under Innis fifth amendment doctrine. 
Under any factual scenario, such an approach will lead to more consis-
tent and less subjective resolutions, which more closely reflect the 
spirit of Miranda and avoid the problems this Note has discussed. 
- Jonathan L. Marks 
